University of Richmond Law Review
Volume 56

Issue 4

Article 7

5-1-2022

Redefining the Badges of Slavery
Nicholas Serafin
Santa Clara University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, Judges Commons, State and Local
Government Law Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons

Recommended Citation
Nicholas Serafin, Redefining the Badges of Slavery, 56 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1291 (2022).
Available at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol56/iss4/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at UR Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in University of Richmond Law Review by an authorized editor of UR Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

REDEFINING THE BADGES OF SLAVERY
Nicholas Serafin *
INTRODUCTION
Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment grants Congress the authority to eliminate the “badges and incidents” of slavery.1 What
constitutes an incident of slavery is clear: the incidents of slavery
are the legal restrictions, such as submission to a master and a ban
on the ownership of productive property, that were inherent in the
institution of slavery itself.2 What constitutes a badge of slavery is
far less certain, and relatively few legal scholars have examined
the historical meaning of the metaphor. Nevertheless, there has
emerged a renewed interest in Section 2, such that the literature
now abounds with proposals for eliminating contemporary badges
of slavery. Section 2 has been cited as grounds for addressing hate
speech,3 the removal of Confederate monuments,4 racial profiling,5

* Assistant Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law. I am grateful to
Elizabeth Anderson, Derrick Darby, Scott Hershovitz, Don Herzog, Jack Balkin, Claire
Priest, and members of the Santa Clara University School of Law Faculty Enrichment Committee for critical feedback. I would also like to thank the editorial staff of the University of
Richmond Law Review.
1. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883) (holding that Section 2 grants Congress the “power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States”).
2. See, e.g., Jennifer Mason McAward, Defining the Badges and Incidents of Slavery,
14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 561, 570–72 (2012) (citing various historical sources indicating that
“an ‘incident’ of slavery was an aspect of the law that was inherently tied to or that flowed
directly from the institution of slavery—a legal restriction that applied to slaves qua slaves
or a legal right that inhered in slaveowners qua slaveowners”); accord George A.
Rutherglen, The Badges and Incidents of Slavery and the Power of Congress to Enforce the
Thirteenth Amendment, in THE PROMISES OF LIBERTY: THE HISTORY AND CONTEMPORARY
RELEVANCE OF THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 163, 164 (Alexander Tsesis ed., 2010).
3. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 106 HARV. L. REV. 124, 155 (1992).
4. See generally Alexander Tsesis, Confederate Monuments as Badges of Slavery, 108
KY. L.J. 695 (2020).
5. See generally William M. Carter, Jr., A Thirteenth Amendment Framework for
Combating Racial Profiling, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 17 (2004).
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sexual orientation discrimination,6 violence against women,7 limitations on the right to an abortion,8 sexual harassment,9 sweatshop
labor,10 and more.11
Yet there is a widening gulf between those who invoke the
badges metaphor in support of contemporary legislative proposals
and those who have examined the history of the metaphor itself.
For legal scholars like Jack Balkin, Akhil Amar, Alexander Tsesis,
and Andrew Koppelman, the badges metaphor can be used to characterize a number of present day injustices, injustices that Congress can address via its Section 2 authority.12 Lending support to
this view is a series of modern cases, beginning with Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Co., in which the Supreme Court of the United States
held that Congress may “determine what are the badges and the
incidents of slavery” and “translate that determination into effective legislation,” subject only to rational basis review.13 If this view
is correct, Congress’s Section 2 authority is more expansive than is
commonly recognized and Section 2 can be used to address a number of contemporary injustices.

6. David P. Tedhams, The Reincarnation of “Jim Crow”: A Thirteenth Amendment
Analysis of Colorado’s Amendment 2, 4 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 133, 134 (1994).
7. See Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Rape as a Badge of Slavery: The Legal History of, and
Remedies for, Prosecutorial Race-of-Victim Charging Disparities, 7 NEV. L.J. 1 (2006); see
also Joyce E. McConnell, Beyond Metaphor: Battered Women, Involuntary Servitude and the
Thirteenth Amendment, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 207, 209 (1992); Pamela Bridgewater,
Reproductive Freedom as Civil Freedom: The Thirteenth Amendment’s Role in the Struggle
for Reproductive Rights, 3 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 401, 403 (2000); Marcellene Elizabeth
Hearn, Comment, A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of the Violence Against Women Act, 146
U. PA. L. REV. 1097, 1100 (1998).
8. Andrew Koppelman, Forced Labor: A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of Abortion,
84 NW. U. L. REV. 480, 483–84 (1990).
9. Jennifer L. Conn, Sexual Harassment: A Thirteenth Amendment Response, 28
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 519, 519 (1995).
10. Samantha C. Halem, Slaves to Fashion: A Thirteenth Amendment Litigation
Strategy to Abolish Sweatshops in the Garment Industry, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 397, 398
(1999).
11. See, e.g., Sarah C. Courtman, Comment, Sweet Land of Liberty: The Case Against
the Federal Marriage Amendment, 24 PACE L. REV. 301, 328 (2003).
12. See Jack M. Balkin, The Reconstruction Power, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1801 (2010);
Amar, supra note 3, at 155; Koppelman, supra note 8, at 483–84; Tsesis, supra note 4.
13. 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968); see also Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 170 (1976)
(reaffirming Jones’ holding that under Section 2 Congress has the power “rationally to
determine what are the badges and the incidents of slavery, and . . . to translate that
determination into effective legislation” (citation omitted)); Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S.
88, 105 (1971) (concluding that “Congress was wholly within its powers under § 2 of the
Thirteenth Amendment in creating a statutory cause of action for Negro citizens who have
been the victims of conspiratorial, racially discriminatory private action aimed at depriving
them of the basic rights that the law secures to all free men”).
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The problem is that while this scholarship may be convincing in
some respects, rarely do these authors offer much historical evidence regarding the meaning of the badges metaphor itself. Moreover, recent Articles by George Rutherglen, Jennifer Mason
McAward, and William Carter, Jr. have examined the history of
the metaphor and have plausibly argued that Congressional authority under Section 2 is narrowly restricted. Broadly speaking,
this latter group of legal scholars argues that the badges metaphor
possesses a limited, historically determined meaning that cannot
sustain most contemporary Section 2 proposals.14 Drawing on legal
history and on the original public meaning of the badges metaphor,
these scholars contend that in the Postbellum legal context the
badges metaphor referred narrowly to practices that threatened to
reimpose chattel slavery or its de facto equivalent.15 Since few, if
any, contemporary injustices threaten to reimpose chattel slavery
or its de facto equivalent, few, if any, badges of slavery remain.
Hence, on this view, Congress generally lacks a predicate for the
exercise of its Section 2 authority, and should Congress attempt to
enact new Section 2 legislation, heightened judicial scrutiny would
be warranted.
No one has yet attempted to defend an expansive view of Section
2 by appealing to legal history and to the original public meaning
of the badges metaphor. This Article provides just such a defense.
While legal scholars advocating for a narrow understanding of Section 2 present a compelling case, I argue in this Article that previous scholarship on the badges metaphor has overlooked just how
often and how broadly the badges metaphor appeared in American
public discourse. Furthermore, previous scholarship on the badges
metaphor has misidentified the legal origins of the term.16 By introducing new historical and legal evidence I shall demonstrate
that the badges metaphor, both in popular discourse and as a legal
term of art, has always possessed a broad range of application.
More specifically, I argue that the badges metaphor referred to
state actions or social customs that stigmatized subordinate social
groups. On the view I shall defend, laws or social customs that impose stigmatic harms upon particular groups are appropriate targets of Section 2 legislation.

14. See infra Part I.
15. See infra section I.A.
16. See infra note 18. But see infra section II.A.
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In Part I, I canvass recent legal scholarship regarding the
badges metaphor and contemporary applications of Section 2. I
demonstrate that existing scholarship on the history of the badges
metaphor largely cuts against an expansive understanding of Section 2. While my overall aim is to vindicate an expansive understanding of Section 2, legal scholars advocating for a restrictive understanding of Section 2 draw upon historical, textual, and legal
evidence that cannot be ignored. Moreover, scholars who seek to
eradicate contemporary badges of slavery have generally not engaged with the history of the metaphor.17 As a result, most contemporary badges proposals are not obviously grounded in any
broader, historically grounded account of Congress’s Section 2 authority.
In Part II, I revisit the history of the badges metaphor. I trace
the origins of the badges metaphor to the Greco-Roman practices
of physically marking slaves and other low status individuals. I
then survey the development of the metaphor within feudal Europe
and the appearance of the metaphor within eighteenth-century
American political discourse. The history I survey reveals that the
badges metaphor extended beyond race and chattel slavery to gender- and class-based subordination. This is in part because the
badges metaphor grew out of the republican intellectual tradition,
according to which slavery consisted of the public or private exercise of arbitrary authority. I then consider the history of the badges
metaphor in American constitutional law. Many constitutional law
scholars have claimed that the badges metaphor first appears in
early postbellum cases such as United States v. Rhodes, Blyew v.
United States, and the Civil Rights Cases.18 As I demonstrate, however, the badges metaphor appears much earlier, in Dred Scott v.
Sandford. The metaphor’s appearance in Dred Scott is deeply revealing and supports an expansive reading of Section 2, yet it has
been overlooked by contemporary legal scholars.
Finally, in Part III, I discuss how Section 2 should be applied to
contemporary issues. To ground this discussion, I consider the constitutionality of the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr., Hate
Crimes Prevention Act, a 2009 piece of federal legislation that Congress enacted in part under Section 2. While proponents of the
17. See infra notes 72–75.
18. See, e.g., Rutherglen, supra note 2, at 172; accord McAward, supra note 2, at 563;
Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 826 n.301 (1999); Balkin, supra
note 12, at 1817 n.64; James Gray Pope, Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment and the
Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 65 UCLA L. REV. 426, 428 (2018).
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restrictive interpretation have criticized the constitutionality of
the Act, I argue that, given the historical usage of the badges metaphor, the Act is well within Congress’s Section 2 authority. I then
consider arguments for citing Section 2 as grounds for legislation
targeting violence against women. I conclude by arguing that, in
light of the history of the badges metaphor, any group that is singled out for status-based deprivations of rights, liberties, or privileges warrants Section 2 protection.
I. THE RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION
In the Civil Rights Cases the Supreme Court held that Section 2
of the Thirteenth Amendment grants Congress the “right to enact
all necessary and proper laws for the obliteration and prevention
of slavery with all its badges and incidents.”19 While the phrase
“badge of slavery” had been in circulation for some time, during the
antebellum period literal slave badges were exceedingly rare, and
references to the badges of slavery were plainly metaphorical.20 Yet
the Civil Rights Cases majority did not offer a clear definition of
the metaphor, leaving undefined the full extent of Congress’s Section 2 authority. An interpretation of the badges metaphor is thus
required in order to identify the limits of Congress’s Section 2 authority. It is important to identify these limits because the potential scope of application of Section 2 is vast: the Thirteenth Amendment contains no state action requirement;21 the Amendment can
sustain legislation applicable to persons of all races;22 and,
19. 109 U.S. 3, 21 (1883).
20. See Rutherglen, supra note 2, at 165 (citation omitted).
21. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 at 20 (stating that the Thirteenth Amendment “is not
a mere prohibition of State laws establishing or upholding slavery, but an absolute declaration that slavery or involuntary servitude shall not exist in any part of the United States”).
22. See United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785, 793 (Cir. Ct. D. Ky. 1866) (holding that
the Thirteenth Amendment “throws its protection over everyone, of every race, color, and
condition”); The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72 (1873) (asserting that
“[u]ndoubtedly while negro slavery alone was in the mind of the Congress which proposed
the thirteenth article, it forbids any other kind of slavery, now or hereafter. If Mexican peonage or the Chinese coolie labor system shall develop slavery of the Mexican or Chinese
race within our territory, this amendment may safely be trusted to make it void”); McDonald
v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 286 (1976) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
“which derives its operative language from § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 . . . explicitly
applies to ‘all persons,’ including white persons”); Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102
(1971) (concluding that § 1985(3), enacted under the Thirteenth Amendment, applies to “racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory” private conspiracies);
Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615 (1987) (holding that § 1982 applies to
discrimination targeting Jewish individuals); Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S.
604, 613 (1987) (holding that § 1981 applies to discrimination targeting individuals of Arabian ancestry because “Congress intended to protect from discrimination identifiable classes

1296

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:1291

according to current precedent, Congress may define the badges of
slavery subject only to rational basis review.23
Legal scholars working on the history and meaning of the badges
metaphor aim to provide historically informed guidelines for Section 2 legislation. According to Jennifer Mason McAward, for example, from historical work on the badges metaphor legal scholars
can derive “an objective methodology under which Congress and
the courts can analyze the historical record and translate that
analysis into workable constraints on legislation.”24 McAward argues that the metaphor’s historically narrow range of usage indicates that Congress’s authority under Section 2 is similarly constrained. In her view, the badges metaphor possesses a “finite,
historically determined range of meaning,” and from this historically determined range of meaning one can derive a principled basis for preventing against Congressional overreach.25
As I discuss below, legal scholars who have examined the history
of the badges metaphor have tended to take a much narrower view
of Congress’s Section 2 authority than legal scholars who have applied the badges metaphor to contemporary legal issues. According
to McAward, for example, the claim that “Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment confers on Congress a broad power to legislate
against discrimination generally overlooks this precise terminology and tends to devalue the immediate aftermath of the slave system.”26 In light of his reading of the badges metaphor, William M.
Carter, Jr. is similarly skeptical of views according to which Congressional authority under Section 2 extends to “any discrimination that is suffered because of membership in any identifiable
group.”27 Both scholars present a plausible and historically-supported account of the badges metaphor and of Section 2. In the following Part, I unpack these views; in Part II, I defend a historically
grounded but more expansive view of the badges metaphor.

of persons who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry
or ethnic characteristics”).
23. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 443 (1968).
24. See McAward, supra note 2, at 568.
25. Jennifer Mason McAward, The Scope of Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment
Enforcement Power After City of Boerne v. Flores, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 77, 144 (2010).
26. See McAward, supra note 2, at 566.
27. See William M. Carter, Jr., Race, Rights, and the Thirteenth Amendment: Defining
the Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1311, 1366 (2006).
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A. From Political Rhetoric to Legal Term of Art
Only recently have legal scholars begun to examine the historical usage and meaning of the badges metaphor. While there is no
scholarly consensus per se, for the sake of clarity I shall present
the work of these scholars as a more or less unitary interpretive
framework, which I will refer to as the “restrictive” interpretation
of the badges metaphor.28 According to the restrictive interpretation, there existed a rhetorical or political usage of “badge of slavery,” which was common in political discourse during the antebellum period, and a distinctively legal usage of the metaphor, which
was not.29 On this view, though often invoked in political argument, the common, public usage of the metaphor lacked the relative clarity and stability of meaning of a legal term of art.30 Whatever its original meaning, or meanings, in political discourse, the
badges metaphor initially had no distinctively legal significance.
According to the restrictive interpretation, the badges metaphor,
as a piece of political rhetoric, first circulated in the speeches and
writings of American abolitionists and republican politicians, for
whom the badges metaphor primarily referred to the public association of African American skin color with chattel slavery.31 For
example, “in an argument before the Supreme Court in 1843, a
lawyer for a slave seeking freedom . . . offered the following observation about American slavery: ‘Colour in a slaveholding state is a
badge of slavery. It is not so where slavery does not exist.’”32 Similarly, during Congressional debates over the Civil Rights Act of
1866, Senator James Harlan of Iowa, describing the Roman

28. For a similar characterization of this debate, see George Rutherglen, The Thirteenth
Amendment, the Power of Congress, and the Shifting Sources of Civil Rights Law, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 1551 (2012).
29. See McAward, supra note 2, at 576 (asserting that “[a]ntebellum legal references to
the ‘badge of slavery’ were relatively infrequent, but the term was commonly used in the
rhetoric of abolitionists as well as the mainstream press”); accord Rutherglen, supra note 2,
at 166 (observing that “[u]nlike its legal use, the political use of [the badges metaphor] was
common in the antebellum era”).
30. See McAward, supra note 2, at 575 (asserting that “[i]t is possible to identify a range
of meanings for the term but difficult to define it precisely”); accord Rutherglen, supra note
2, at 164, 166 (noting that the metaphor referred generally to “evidence of political
subjugation” but possesses “inherent ambiguity”).
31. See Rutherglen, supra note 2, at 166; accord McAward, supra note 2, at 576 (arguing
that “[a]ntebellum legal references to the ‘badge of slavery’ were relatively infrequent, but
the term was commonly used in the rhetoric of abolitionists as well as the mainstream
press”).
32. See Rutherglen, supra note 2, at 166 (citation omitted).
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practice of slavery, noted that “[c]olor at Rome was not even a
badge of degradation. It had no application to the question of slavery.”33
To be sure, as proponents of the restrictive interpretation
acknowledge, skin color was perhaps not the only badge of slavery.
During these same debates the Act’s sponsor, Senator Lyman
Trumbull, defined a badge of servitude as “any statute which is not
equal to all, and which deprives any citizen of civil rights which are
secured to other citizens.”34 While this would seem to cut against
the restrictive interpretation, McAward argues that Trumbull is
here simply equating the badges metaphor with the legal incidents
of slavery.35 Similarly, for the abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison,
antimiscegenation laws constituted “a disgraceful badge of servitude.”36 Yet, according to Rutherglen, “this sense of ‘badge’ rarely
appeared in the law of slavery.”37 Overall, for proponents of the restrictive interpretation, throughout the nineteenth century the
badges metaphor “had a relatively narrow range of meanings, referring to the color of an African American’s skin or other indications of legal and social inferiority connected with slavery.”38
After emerging in nineteenth-century political discourse as a
metaphorical reference to skin color and to the incidents of American slavery, the badges metaphor was then adopted by the federal
courts.39 According to proponents of the restrictive interpretation,
and in the view of many other constitutional scholars, the origins
of the metaphor as a distinctly legal term of art can be traced to a
series of federal court cases concerning the scope of Congress’s enforcement power under Section 2.40 For instance, in the 1866 case
United States v. Rhodes, Justice Noah Swayne, riding circuit, observed that free African Americans during the antebellum period
“had but few civil and no political rights in the slave states. Many
of the badges of the bondman’s degradation were fastened upon
them.”41 Justice Joseph Bradley, dissenting in the 1871 case Blyew
33. See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1438 (1864).
34. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866).
35. See McAward, supra note 2, at 578.
36. See Rutherglen, supra note 2, at 165 (citation omitted).
37. See Rutherglen, supra note 2, at 166.
38. See McAward, supra note 2, at 581.
39. See Rutherglen, supra note 2, at 172 (arguing that the “trajectory of [the
metaphor’s] rise to prominence was from Senator Trumbull to Justice Bradley[’s]” majority
opinion in the Civil Rights Cases).
40. See infra section I.A.
41. 27 F. Cas. 785, 793 (Cir. Ct. D. Ky. 1866).
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v. United States, asserted that to “deprive a whole class” of the
right to provide testimony in criminal prosecutions “is to brand
them with a badge of slavery; is to expose them to wanton insults
and fiendish assaults; is to leave their lives, their families, and
their property unprotected by law.”42
Writing for the majority roughly a decade later in the Civil
Rights Cases, Justice Bradley once again invoked the metaphor,
arguing that Section 2 “clothes Congress with power to pass all
laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents
of slavery in the United States.”43 But Bradley construed the metaphor narrowly, limiting the badges of slavery to public laws that
approximated the “burdens and incapacities [that] were the inseparable incidents of [slavery].”44 According to Bradley, during the
antebellum period private acts of discrimination targeting free African Americans were not considered badges of slavery, because
“no one, at that time,” thought that African Americans ought to be
“admitted to all the privileges enjoyed by white citizens,” such as
equal access to public facilities.45
The restrictive interpretation maintains that the metaphor’s
transformation into a distinctively legal term of art constituted a
break with the metaphor as political rhetoric.46 On this view, from
Rhodes to the Civil Rights Cases the metaphor was “transform[ed]
and broaden[ed] . . . to refer to the broader set of political, civil, and
legal disadvantages imposed on slaves, former slaves, and free
blacks.”47 This transformation followed post-emancipation attempts to re-enslave newly freed Black people, such that the
badges metaphor, in the postbellum legal context, came to refer to
public laws that threatened to reimpose chattel slavery or its de
facto equivalent.48
In sum, proponents of the restrictive interpretation closely link
the badges metaphor to the incidents of slavery and to postbellum
practices that approximated the incidents of slavery. According to
this view, there existed a rhetorical or political usage of the badges
42. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581, 599 (1872) (Bradley, J., dissenting).
43. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
44. Id. at 22.
45. Id. at 25.
46. See McAward, supra note 2, at 575 (claiming that the metaphor’s “meaning
appeared to evolve from the antebellum to postbellum eras, particularly as it migrated from
colloquial to legal use”).
47. Id. at 578.
48. Id. at 569, 581.
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metaphor distinct from the legal term of art; the metaphor, as a
legal term of art, referred to the incidents of slavery, and to legal
disabilities imposed upon newly freed African Americans that approximated the incidents of slavery; and, the federal judiciary first
took up the metaphor in cases such as Blyew, Rhodes, and the Civil
Rights Cases as a gloss on the scope of Congressional authority under Section 2. From this historical analysis, proponents of the restrictive interpretation conclude that Congress’s contemporary
Section 2 authority is limited to addressing contemporary legal attempts to reestablish chattel slavery or its de facto equivalent. Section 2, according to this view, is “prophylactic,” in the sense that
Section 2 forbids “conduct beyond actual enslavement” in order to
prevent the “de facto reemergence” of slavery.49
In Part II, I criticize these claims and offer an alternative view
of the badges metaphor. First, however, to get a sense of what is at
stake, I shall introduce some of the main questions concerning the
badges metaphor and the scope of Section 2.
B. Defining the Scope of Section 2
It is helpful to frame the relationship between the badges metaphor and Section 2 as revolving around a set of interrelated questions.50 First, to which groups does the metaphor apply? Is the imposition of a badge of slavery limited to the descendants of slaves
or to racial and ethnic minorities generally, or can badges of slavery be imposed upon other groups as well? Second, to which practices does the metaphor refer? Is the badges metaphor limited to
practices that were integral to or closely associated with chattel
slavery, or should other, less central aspects of chattel slavery fall
within its scope? In this survey I shall describe approaches as restrictive or expansive depending upon the answers they provide to
the above questions, though these descriptive labels are intended
merely to situate different views in relation to the literature as a
whole.
To which groups does the badges metaphor apply? The most restrictive approach to Section 2 identifies African Americans as the
only group to which the badges metaphor can apply. Though this
approach is generally rejected by courts and scholars, it is not without some prima facie support. As I noted above, according to the
49. See McAward, supra note 25, at 143.
50. This framing roughly follows that of McAward. See McAward, supra note 2, at 605.
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restrictive interpretation, the badges metaphor was used primarily
to refer to the skin color of African Americans and to legal burdens
associated with enslavement.51 Moreover, while members of the
Reconstruction Congress evinced concern for other racial groups,
African Americans were foremost in mind during the debates over
the Thirteenth Amendment and other Reconstruction-era legislation.52 No plausible approach to the badges metaphor—or to the
Thirteenth Amendment more broadly—can overlook the centrality
of African American subjugation to American chattel slavery and
to the badges thereof. On the other hand, the Thirteenth Amendment was written in race-neutral terms, and subsequent court
precedent has confirmed that the Thirteenth Amendment extends
to other racial groups.53 Thus, while concern for the subjugation of
African Americans surely lies at the heart of the Thirteenth
Amendment, the power to eliminate the badges of slavery under
Section 2 may extend to other groups as well.
Much of the current debate surrounding the scope of the badges
metaphor takes place between these two poles. Broadly speaking,
proponents of a relatively expansive approach to Section 2 support
the application of the badges metaphor to any social group that is
subjected to some key aspect of American chattel slavery. Sydney
Buchanan first staked out this position. According to Buchanan,
any act of arbitrary, group-based prejudice imposes upon its victims a badge of slavery.54 This is because, Buchanan argues, “[a]
chief vice of the institution of slavery was its arbitrary irrationality
. . . .”55 Moreover, Buchanan claims, supporters of the Thirteenth
Amendment and of the 1866 Civil Rights Act “were intensely concerned with [group-based] prejudice.”56 Thus, for Buchanan,
51. See supra text accompanying notes 31, 33.
52. John Hayakawa Torok, Reconstruction and Racial Nativism: Chinese Immigrants
and the Debates on the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments and Civil Rights
Laws, 3 ASIAN AM. L.J. 55, 57 (1996) (“The congressional debates on citizenship for Blacks
included discussions of Chinese immigrants because they were in the United States, and
their very presence made necessary a determination of their possible inclusion as citizens.”);
see also Jacobus tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States:
Consummation to Abolition and Key to the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 CALIF. L. REV. 171,
202 (1951) (“The anti-slavery backgrounds of the Civil War amendments are conceded by
all.”).
53. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
54. G. Sidney Buchanan, The Quest for Freedom: A Legal History of the Thirteenth
Amendment, 12 HOUS. L. REV. 1070, 1074 (1975) (“There is nothing in this language that
confines the enforcement power of Congress to the protection of any particular race or class
of persons.”).
55. Id. at 1073.
56. Id. at 1076.

1302

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:1291

legislation targeting widespread, arbitrary, group-based prejudice
is a valid exercise of Congressional authority under Section 2, regardless of the identity of the group toward which this prejudice is
directed.
Jack Balkin defines slavery more narrowly than Buchanan but
defends a view that is perhaps just as expansive. According to Balkin, “[s]lavery was not just legal ownership of people; it was an
entire system of conventions, understandings, practices, and institutions that conferred power and social status and maintained economic and social dependency.”57 Thus, for Balkin, if Congress is to
eliminate the badges of slavery it must “disestablish all the institutions, practices, and customs associated with slavery and make
sure they can never rise up again.”58 Balkin defends a “class-protecting strategy,” according to which Congress may protect minority groups from practices that would deny them equal citizenship.59
For instance, Balkin argues that Congress could rationally conclude that certain practices impose second-class citizenship upon
women and LGBTQ individuals, implying that his approach extends to any group subject to systematic private or public discrimination.60
Contemporary Section 2 proposals generally follow Buchanan
and Balkin in assuming that other groups can bear a badge of slavery.61 But proponents of the restrictive interpretation have taken
issue with this assumption. William M. Carter, Jr., for example,
maintains that inclusive approaches to the badges metaphor “minimize[] the Amendment’s historical context and marginalize[] the
reality of chattel slavery and its effects upon the enslaved and society by treating slavery merely as a stepping stone to the admittedly laudable goal of combating all forms of inequality.”62 According to Carter, though nonracial groups may be subjects of Section
2 legislation, a badges of slavery claim must evince a fairly close
connection to the history of American chattel slavery. Section 2 legislation must target practices that are “closely tied to the structures supporting or created by the system of slavery.”63

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Balkin, supra note 12, at 1817.
Id.
Id. at 1852.
Id. at 1835–36, 1851–52.
See supra text accompanying notes 54, 57–60.
Carter, supra note 27, at 1366.
Id. at 1369.
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McAward, pressing a number of structural and historical points,
defends perhaps the most restrictive approach to the badges metaphor. Expansive approaches, she argues, would encroach upon
the judiciary, for they would “allow Congress to grant substantial
civil rights protections to groups that the Supreme Court has not
yet deemed to be suspect or quasi-suspect classes deserving of
heightened federal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.”64 Moreover, as a historical matter, McAward takes issue
with Buchanan’s claim that Reconstruction Republicans were concerned with group-based prejudice per se. As McAward reads the
historical record “the clear expectation was that [Section 2] concerned itself specifically with race and the legacy of American slavery.”65 In McAward’s view, Section 2 only licenses Congress “to protect people from the badges and incidents of slavery imposed on
account of race or previous condition of servitude,” a conclusion
that would clearly rule out Section 2 proposals that include nonracial groups.66
To which practices does the badges metaphor refer? Contemporary scholars differ over the range of contemporary practices that
can be thought to impose a badge of slavery, and much of this debate turns on questions similar to those surveyed above, namely,
the historical usage of the badges metaphor; the nature of chattel
slavery and its aftermath; the pre- and post-enactment legislative
record; and the extent to which Reconstruction changed the structure of the American government.67
Here, again, Sydney Buchanan’s work on the Thirteenth Amendment stands as the most expansive approach to Section 2 legislation. Recall that, for Buchanan, the central evil of slavery consisted
of widespread group-based prejudice.68 Widespread, group-based
prejudice, Buchanan argues, has the “capacity to clog the channels
of opportunity.”69 The victims of such prejudice “tend[] to be
thwarted at every turn in [their] pursuit of normal human endeavors.”70 In other words, victims of widespread group-based prejudice
suffer the same general type of harm as did the victims of chattel

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

McAward, supra note 2, at 613.
Id.
Id. at 614.
See infra section I.A.
See Buchanan, supra note 54, at 1073.
Id. at 1078.
Id.
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slavery, and so Congress possesses the authority under Section 2
to prevent such prejudices from taking root.
Balkin defends a similarly open-ended view of Congress’s Section 2 authority. According to Balkin, the “badges and incidents of
slavery” refers to “all the institutions, practices, and customs associated with slavery.”71 Since Congress possesses the power to eliminate the badges of slavery, Balkin argues, “Congress has the
power to dismantle the interlocking social structures and statusenforcing practices that were identified with slavery or that rationalized and perpetuated it.”72 For Balkin, as well as Buchanan, the
badges metaphor would seemingly justify Section 2 legislation that
reaches the kind of group-based prejudice that, when brought before a court, now generally falls under the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. One consequence of this approach
is that Section 2 might cover a broader range of persons and conduct than that covered by the Equal Protection clause, given that
the Thirteenth Amendment has no state action requirement.73
Other scholars applying the badges metaphor to contemporary
legal issues have not generally defended or cited more expansive
views of Section 2 authority. Rather, contemporary applications of
the badges metaphor tend to rely on specific, individual comparisons between evils that persisted under slavery and present day
concerns. Jeffrey J. Pokorak, for example, observes that “antebellum prejudices and practices kept the prosecution of rape of a Black
woman a rare, if extant, occurrence.”74 In Pokorak’s view, contemporary disparities in the legal protections afforded to Black female
victims of rape thus constitute badges of slavery.75 Andrew Koppelman argues that anti-abortion laws impose involuntary servitude
upon pregnant women who would otherwise terminate their pregnancies, violating Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment.76 But
such laws also violate Section 2, Koppelman argues, “[b]ecause the
subordination of women, like that of blacks, has traditionally been
reinforced by a complex pattern of symbols and practices, [and] the

71. See Balkin, supra note 12, at 1817.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1806.
74. Pokorak, supra note 7, at 7.
75. Id. at 22.
76. Andrew Koppelman, Forced Labor, Revisited: The Thirteenth Amendment and
Abortion, in THE PROMISES OF LIBERTY: THE HISTORY AND CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE OF
THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 226, 227 (Alexander Tsesis ed., 2010).
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amendment’s prohibition extends to those symbols and practices.”77
Contemporary applications of the badges metaphor tend to follow a similar argumentative strategy. That is, scholars offering
contemporary Section 2 proposals have tended to assume that present-day inequities that are sufficiently analogous to a central aspect or aspects of chattel slavery constitute badges of slavery.78
While I am sympathetic to such arguments, and while my analysis
of the badges metaphor in Part II is intended to vindicate an expansive view of Section 2, it is nevertheless hard to deny that the
badges metaphor has been “often-invoked but under-theorized.”79
For example, note that, while Balkin draws upon the history of the
metaphor, the few examples he cites are primarily references to
the incidents of chattel slavery, not its badges, and thus do not obviously support his broader view, namely, that Congress, utilizing
its Section 2 authority, may eliminate all contemporary “statusenforcing practices.”80 Similarly, though Koppelman draws a plausible analogy between child-birth and indentured servitude, he
presents almost no historical evidence regarding the usage of the
badges metaphor in support of his conclusion that laws restricting
access to abortion impose badges of slavery.81
Proponents of the restrictive interpretation have constructed a
far more historically supported account of the meaning of the
badges metaphor and the contours of Section 2. McAward, for example, citing the early postbellum statements of litigators, legislators, and Supreme Court justices, argues that two conditions must
be met for a contemporary practice to impose a badge of slavery.
Recall that, on the restrictive interpretation, the badges metaphor,
as a legal term of art, referred to the incidents of slavery and to
laws that attempted to reimpose chattel slavery or its de facto
equivalent upon African Americans.82 This usage suggests that
77. Id. at 233.
78. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Conn, Sexual Harassment: A Thirteenth Amendment Response,
28 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 519, 551 (1995) (discussing the maltreatment of female slaves
and concluding that “today’s working women experience some of the same differences in
their treatment based exclusively on their sex”); see also David P. Tedhams, The
Reincarnation of “Jim Crow:” A Thirteenth Amendment Analysis of Colorado’s Amendment,
4 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 133, 165 (1994) (asserting that, analogous to “Jim Crow” laws,
Colorado’s Amendment 2 imposed a badge of slavery by stigmatizing gay and lesbian
individuals).
79. See McAward, supra note 2, at 564.
80. See Balkin, supra note 12, at 1817.
81. See Koppelman, supra note 8, at 487.
82. See supra section I.A.
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Section 2 legislation targeting the badges of slavery must be limited to addressing contemporary practices that “mirror a historical
incident of slavery.”83 Section 2 is prophylactic, in that it may only
reach contemporary practices, public or private, that “pose a risk
of causing the renewed legal subjugation of the targeted class.”84
Given that the badges metaphor “is ambiguous and potentially expansive, and Congress could easily manipulate it to cover conduct
far removed from the historical core of the slave system itself,”
these limiting conditions provide guidance to courts reviewing Section 2 legislation for Congressional overreach.85
To get a sense of the practical implications of this debate, it is
helpful to consider a few examples. Again, according to the restrictive interpretation, Section 2 legislation may only address conduct
that, “left unaddressed, would have the cumulative effect of subordinating an entire race to the point that it would render it unable
to participate in and enjoy the benefits of civil society.”86 According
to this view, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 is a paradigmatic example
of Section 2 legislation that satisfies the restrictive interpretation,
for the Act “addressed state laws that sought to reimpose the incidents of slavery by restricting freed slaves’ fundamental civil liberties.”87 By contrast, most modern applications of the badges metaphor address conduct that, though wrongful, would not lead to the
reimposition of chattel slavery or its de facto equivalent. Regardless of one’s normative commitments, it is hard to believe that laws
forbidding gay marriage or restricting access to abortion would reduce gay people or women to chattel slaves or indentured servants;
nor would such laws plausibly threaten to reestablish chattel slavery. Thus, for proponents of the restrictive interpretation, Section
2 provides no authority to Congress to address these injustices.
Proponents of the restrictive interpretation do not limit their
analysis only to hypothetical uses of Section 2. Consider, for example, the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr., Hate Crimes Prevention Act (“HCPA”). The HCPA includes two sections, 249(a)(1)
and 249(a)(2), identifying the classifications that receive protection
under the Act. Section 249(a)(1) establishes criminal penalties for
assaults motivated by the victim’s “actual or perceived race, color,

83. See McAward, supra note 2, at 622.
84. Id.
85. See McAward, supra note 25, at 137.
86. See McAward, supra note 2, at 629.
87. Id. at 628.
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religion, or national origin.”88 Section 249(a)(1) was enacted pursuant to Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment Section 2 authority to
eradicate the badges and incidents of slavery. The Act’s findings
section states that “[s]lavery and involuntary servitude were enforced, both prior to and after the adoption of the 13th amendment
to the Constitution of the United States, through widespread public and private violence directed at persons because of their race,
color or ancestry.”89 According to this section, “eliminating racially
motivated violence is an important means of eliminating, to the
extent possible, the badges, incidents, and relics of slavery and involuntary servitude.”90
Section 249(a)(2) of the HCPA establishes criminal penalties for
assaults motivated by the victim’s “gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability.”91 Though § 249(a)(2) was enacted pursuant to Congress’s Commerce Clause authority, it is likely that
the constitutionality of § 249(a)(2) will ultimately depend upon
Congress’s Section 2 authority. This is because, in light of contemporary Commerce Clause jurisprudence, it is doubtful that Congress’s Commerce Clause authority is sufficient to sustain
§ 249(a)(2).92 This leaves Section 2 as the other possible source of
legislative authority for this section of the Act. As Calvin Massey
observed, § 249(a)(2) will survive “only if courts accept the fiction”
that the badges of slavery include nonracial badges of slavery.93
For proponents of the restrictive interpretation, the HCPA is
likely unconstitutional. Section 249(a)(2) is unconstitutional because the badges concept referred specifically to race-based chattel
slavery.94 But § 249(a)(1) is also unconstitutional because, on the
restrictive interpretation, Section 2 legislation is warranted only if
such legislation targets conduct that, left unchecked, would lead to
the reestablishment of chattel slavery or its de facto equivalent,
88. 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1).
89. 18 U.S.C. § 249 (2012) (quoting National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2835).
90. Id.
91. 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2).
92. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610–11 (observing that “Lopez’s review of
Commerce Clause case law demonstrates that in those cases where we have sustained federal regulation of intrastate activity based upon the activity’s substantial effects on interstate commerce, the activity in question has been some sort of economic endeavor” (citing
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559–60 (1995)).
93. See Calvin Massey, The Effect of Shelby County on Enforcement of the
Reconstruction Amendments, 29 J.L. & POL. 397, 425–26 (2014).
94. See McAward, supra note 2, at 630 (defining a badge of slavery as “public or
widespread private action, based on race or previous condition of servitude”).
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and “it is mercifully difficult to envision any racist act” such “that
one could reasonably fear the return of an entire race (or even a
single individual of that race) to slavery or legally subordinate status.”95 At the very least, Congress has provided no evidence indicating a causal connection between racially motivated violence and
the reestablishment of chattel slavery.96 For proponents of the restrictive interpretation, because Congress has neglected to provide
evidence establishing a link between bias-motivated violence and
the reemergence of chattel slavery, § 249(a)(1) likely outruns Congress’s Section 2 authority.
Finally, note that the restrictive interpretation is also at odds
with the Court’s holding in Jones, that Congress may define the
badges of slavery subject only to rational basis review.97 If, as the
restrictive interpretation maintains, the badges metaphor possesses “a finite range of meaning that is tied closely to the core
aspects of the slave system and its aftermath,” courts confronted
with challenges to Section 2 legislation must carefully scrutinize
such legislation to ensure that Congress has not extended the concept beyond its original scope of application.98 Thus, whereas Jones
requires that Section 2 legislation be submitted only to rational
basis review, McAward “would revise Jones by clarifying that Congress’s discretion is limited to identifying which badges and incidents of slavery it will address—not defining them outright—and
then determining how it will address them.”99 Moreover, for proponents of the restrictive interpretation, revising Jones in this way
would have the added benefit of bringing the Court’s Thirteenth
Amendment jurisprudence more into line with its recent Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.100

95. See id. at 626.
96. Jennifer Mason McAward, McCulloch and the Thirteenth Amendment, 112 COLUM.
L. REV. 1769, 1807 (2012) (asserting that § 249(a)(1) “lacks any indication that the victims
of race-based hate crimes are at risk of having their Section 1 rights violated, either by being
treated as slaves or denied basic civil freedom; nor does the analysis feature any finding
that federalizing such crimes will alleviate that risk”).
97. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 443–44 (1968).
98. See McAward, supra note 25, at 142.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 138 (noting that “one would expect Congress’s Section 2 power and Jones to
be cabined in the same way that City of Boerne cabined Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement powers”). But see Alexander Tsesis, Congressional Authority to Interpret the
Thirteenth Amendment, 71 MD. L. REV. 40, 40–42 (2011) (arguing that “the historical and
jurisprudential background of the Thirteenth Amendment indicates that Boerne’s congruent
and proportional test is inapplicable to the judicial review of Thirteenth Amendment enforcement authority”).
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To be sure, the restrictive interpretation is not wholly at odds
with contemporary uses of Section 2. For example, McAward raises
the possibility that disparate impact claims might fall under Section 2.101 But on her view, in order to sustain such claims it would
have to be shown that the disparities in question, if left unaddressed, would bring about the reemergence of chattel slavery,
involuntary servitude, or their de facto equivalents, and “[t]his
could be a very difficult showing to make.”102 Ultimately it is unclear whether, in practice, the restrictive interpretation would allow for any contemporary Section 2 legislation, though proponents
of the restrictive interpretation accept this result as “the unavoidable consequence of remaining true to Supreme Court doctrine that
Section 1 protects only against slavery and coerced labor and to the
prophylactic purpose of Section 2 legislation.”103
Overall, the restrictive interpretation constitutes a plausible,
historically grounded interpretation of the badges metaphor, an interpretation that rules out virtually all contemporary proposals for
eradicating purported badges of slavery. Few of these proposals
have engaged at length with the history of the metaphor; none
have demonstrated that the targeted conduct, left unaddressed,
would bring about the reemergence of chattel slavery, involuntary
servitude, or their de facto equivalents. In many cases, this argument would be rather difficult to defend. Having set forth the main
issues, I shall now turn to the badges metaphor itself. As I demonstrate in the next Part, the history of the badges metaphor is significantly underexplored and thus warrants further analysis on its
own. After revisiting this history, I shall present and defend an
expansive account of Section 2.
II. REDEFINING THE BADGES OF SLAVERY
The restrictive interpretation of the badges metaphor rests on
three key claims: first, that in American political discourse the
metaphor, though somewhat vague, primarily referred to African
American skin color and to the incidents of chattel slavery; second,
that the metaphor as it appeared in American political discourse
was distinct from the metaphor as a legal term of art; and, third,
that the legal term of art first emerged in early postbellum

101. See McAward, supra note 2, at 610 & n.253.
102. Id. at 617 & n.290.
103. Id. at 627.
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Supreme Court cases solely as a reference to the attempted re-enslavement of newly freed African Americans.104 For proponents of
the restrictive interpretation, contemporary applications of the
badges metaphor under Section 2 are historically supported and
thus constitutionally sound only if they similarly target attempts
to reestablish chattel slavery or its de facto equivalent. On this
view, since few contemporary injustices threaten to reestablish
chattel slavery or its de facto equivalent, Section 2 is largely dead
letter.
In this Part, I introduce historical evidence that rebuts each of
these claims. Contemporary scholarship on Section 2 overlooks a
great deal of the intellectual history of the badges metaphor and
thus misconstrues the meaning of the metaphor in American political discourse and jurisprudence. This is likely due in part to the
fact that the badges metaphor was actually not a single term but
rather a cluster of tropes referring to various stigmatizing laws and
customs. Indeed, as proponents of the restrictive interpretation
acknowledge, politicians, judges, and others often used synonymous constructions, such as “badge of degradation,” “badge of disgrace,” “badge of servitude,” and “badge of subjection,” interchangeably with “badge of slavery.”105 Other, similar constructions
referred to laws or social practices restricting the rights of African
Americans as imposing a “mark of servitude”106 or “mark of degradation,”107 phrases that drew upon the literal definition of a badge
as a “distinctive device, emblem, or mark.”108 Taking these synonymous constructions are taken into account, it is clear that the linguistic norms governing usage of the badges metaphor were far
more expansive than the restrictive interpretation allows.
I demonstrate in this section that the badges metaphor was for
centuries a common trope in the Western political tradition. Originating in the Roman Republican practice of physical status markings, the metaphor was taken up in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by republican critics of monarchical government,
feminist and labor activists, and other moral reformers. As a legal

104. See infra section I.A.
105. See McAward, supra note 2, at 578 (equating “badge of degradation” and “badge of
servitude” with “badge of slavery”); see also Rutherglen, supra note 2, at 168 (noting usage
of “badge of degradation” to refer to slavery).
106. ANONYMOUS, AFRICAN SERVITUDE: WHEN, WHY, AND BY WHOM INSTITUTED. BY
WHOM, AND HOW LONG, SHALL IT BE MAINTAINED? 12 (1860).
107. See infra section II.C.
108. See Rutherglen, supra note 2, at 165.
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term of art, the badges metaphor first appeared not in Rhodes,
Blyew, and the Civil Rights Cases, as is commonly claimed, but in
the majority and concurring opinions in Dred Scott v. Sanford. A
close reading of Chief Justice Roger Taney’s majority opinion in
Dred Scott demonstrates that the badges metaphor referred to
state actions or social customs that stigmatized subordinate social
groups. In the following section, I discuss the implications of adopting a stigma-based interpretation of the badges metaphor for Section 2 legislation.
A. Origins and Development
The origins of the badges metaphor lie in the Greco-Roman practices of marking slaves, convicts, prisoners of war, and other low
status individuals. To some extent status markings were a solution
to the practical problem of identification; as many Athenians recognized, slaves made up a significant proportion of the Athenian
population yet could not be reliably distinguished from free citizens.109 In his commentaries on the Athenian constitution, for example, Pseudo-Xenophon claims despairingly that in Athens
slaves and citizens were often indistinguishable.110 Writing approximately eighty years later, Aristotle attempts to solve the
problem by suggesting that “[i]t is nature’s intention also to erect
a physical difference between the bodies of freemen and those of
slaves.”111 Yet, he admits, frequently enough slaves have the appearance of freemen, and vice versa.112
Writing contemporaneously, (the actual) Xenophon describes
one conventional solution for identifying slaves, namely, affixing a
“public mark” onto the slave’s body.113 Branding or, more commonly, tattooing the skin was used by the Greeks to identify and
derogate low-status individuals, particularly slaves, prisoners of
109. R.K. SINCLAIR, DEMOCRACY AND PARTICIPATION IN ATHENS 196–97 (1991) (noting
that while estimates vary widely, slaves in classical Athens likely made up somewhere between one-fourth and one-third of the total population).
110. E.C. Marchant, Pseudo-Xenophon (Old Oligarch), Constitution of the Athenians,
THE PERSEUS PROJECT, https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3
A1999.01.0158 [https://perma.cc/4MNV-J7QB] (arguing that “if it were customary for a
slave . . . to be struck by one who is free, you would often hit an Athenian citizen by mistake
on the assumption that he was a slave.” The problem, he claims, is that “[f]or the people
there are no better dressed than the slaves and metics, nor are they any more handsome”).
111. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS bk. 1, at 17 (Ernest Barker, trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1995).
112. Id.
113. XENOPHON, Ways and Means, in SCRIPTA MINORA 213 (Jeffrey Henderson ed., E.C.
Marchant trans., Harv. Univ. Press 1925).
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war (who were often sold into slavery), and convicts.114 Delinquent
slaves and convicts often had their faces tattooed with the name of
their crimes.115 In the Laws, for instance, Plato proposes that “if
anyone is caught committing sacrilege, if he be a slave or a
stranger, let his offence be written on his face and his hands.”116
The Greek term for puncturing or marking the skin, στίζειν, referred to marks, στῐ́γμᾰ, or stigma, signifying disgrace and degradation.117
Under the Roman Empire slaves were also marked by tattoos or
brands; however, Roman slaves were also fitted with a signaculum,
a lead stamp or badge affixed permanently around the neck.118 In
addition to evidence documenting literal badges of slavery, there is
at least some evidence that slave badges were understood metaphorically as well. As Rutherglen points out, in the Annals, Tacitus
writes of an episode in which a conquered king requests through
an intermediary that he not have to “endure any badge of slavery.”119 Interestingly, however, the phrase used, imaginem servitii,
refers to an “image” or “likeness” of servitude, not to a literal badge,
or signaculum, which is understandable in light of the fact that
accompanying the king’s plea is a list of acts, such as surrendering
his sword, that would not constitute a literal badge but would, for
a king, surely give off an image of subjugation.120
Though the origins of the badges metaphor lie in antiquity, it is
not until the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that one finds
it in widespread use. While the use of metal slave collars persisted
well into the eighteenth century, during this period the scope of the
badges metaphor greatly expands.121 For example, for hundreds of
years prior to the American Civil War, writers throughout the English-speaking world used the metaphor, or a variant, to condemn
perceived acts of political oppression in the form of taxation122,

114. C.P. Jones, Stigma: Tattooing and Branding in Graeco-Roman Antiquity, 77 J.
ROMAN STUD. 139, 147 (1987).
115. Id. at 147–48.
116. PAGE DUBOIS, SLAVES AND OTHER OBJECTS 108 (2003).
117. See Jones, supra note 114, at 142–43.
118. ALISON E. COOLEY, THE CAMBRIDGE MANUAL OF LATIN EPIGRAPHY 101–02, 197–98
(2012).
119. See Rutherglen, supra note 2, at 163, 166 & n.23 (citations omitted).
120. TACITUS, THE ANNALS bk. XV, ch. XXXI, at 262–63 (Jeffrey Henderson ed., John
Jackson trans., Harv. Univ. Press 1937).
121. William W. Heist, The Collars of Gurth and Wamba, 4 REV. ENG. STUD. 361, 362–
64 (1953) (discussing the usage of metal serf collars in eighteenth-century Scotland).
122. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *314–15.
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tything123, tributary payments124, the imposition of curfews,125 and
political borders.126 In seventeenth-century England, members of
the egalitarian, republican Leveller and Digger movements objected to copyhold tenure as “the ancient and almost antiquated
badge of slavery.”127 Writing nearly a century later, David Hume
argued that the English monarch’s prerogative of wardship, which
permitted the monarch to take over the profits of an estate in certain circumstances, constituted a badge of slavery.128 Eighteenthcentury writers invoked the badges metaphor in condemnation of
police entry into private homes,129 economic restrictions on colonial
commercial activity,130 and cultural forms of oppression: according
to William Blackstone, for example, a badge of slavery was imposed
upon the English during the eleventh-century Norman Conquest
of England, because the occupiers forced English courts to use the
French language.131
While slave badges of a sort were in use in various parts of the
United States throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the practice was uncommon.132 References to the badges of
slavery in this period are plainly metaphorical and refer to other
forms of subordination, such as the wearing of livery—a uniform,
badge, or other visual element “signify[ing] possession and

123. JAMES TYRRELL, BIBLIOTHECA POLITICA: OR, AN ENQUIRY INTO THE ANTIENT
CONSTITUTION OF THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT WITH RESPECT TO THE JUST EXTENT OF THE
REGAL POWER, AND THE RIGHTS AND LIBERITES OF THE SUBJECT 548 (London, 1718).
124. THOMAS GREENWOOD, THE FIRST BOOK OF THE HISTORY OF THE GERMANS:
BARBARIC PERIOD 426–27 (London, Longman, Rees, Orme & Co. 1836).
125. SOCIETY FOR PROMOTING CHRISTIAN KNOWLEDGE, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND 24
(London, 6th ed. 1854) (describing as a badge of servitude a “law directing that all fires
should be put out at the tolling of a bell at eight o’clock”).
126. FRANCIS PALGRAVE, THE LORD AND THE VASSAL: A FAMILIAR EXPOSITION OF THE
FEUDAL SYSTEM IN THE MIDDLE AGES; WITH ITS CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 82–83 (London,
John W. Parker 1844) (observing that ancient German tribes “considered it a badge of
servitude to be obliged to dwell in a city surrounded by walls”).
127. Joan Thirsk, Agrarian Problems and the English Revolution, in TOWN AND
COUNTRYSIDE IN THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION 169, 184 (Roger Charles Richardson ed., 1992).
128. DAVID HUME, TOBIAS SMOLLETT & THOMAS SMART HUGHES, THE HISTORY OF
ENGLAND 363 (1834).
129. JOHN PHILLIP REID, THE CONCEPT OF LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 41–42 (1988).
130. 2 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 424–25 (M. Garnier ed., Edinburgh, 1806).
131. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *317; Mark Cartwright, The Impact of the
Norman Conquest of England, WORLD HIST. ENCYC. (Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.world
history.org/article/1323/the-impact-of-the-norman-conquest-of-england [https://perma.cc/7
TCA-FKMD].
132. See Rutherglen, supra note 2, at 165.
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ownership, that of the lord over the servant.”133 Some Americans
loudly condemned the wearing of livery; in an 1882 Congressional
debate New York House Representative William Robinson furiously declared that “Jefferson would never [have] let one of his employés” wear this “degrading . . . badge of slavery.”134 Austrian
journalist Francis Joseph Grund noted the “unwillingness of the
poorer classes of Americans to hire themselves out as servants”
and their refusal to “submit to the degradation of wearing a livery
or any other badge of servitude.”135 American jurists also tied the
badges metaphor to signifiers and practices associated with feudal
hierarchy. In the Civil Rights Cases, for example, the majority
notes that, during the Ancien Régime “all inequalities and observances exacted by one man from another were servitudes, or
badges of slavery,” which the revolutionary National Assembly, “in
its effort to establish universal liberty, made haste to wipe out and
destroy.”136 Likely the majority is referring to the National Assembly’s Decree on the Abolition of the Nobility, which abolished,
among other signifiers of hierarchy, the wearing of livery.137
Nineteenth-century feminists also commonly invoked the
badges metaphor. In an early feminist work, Appeal of One Half
the Human Race, Women, William Thompson and Anna Wheeler
draw an extended analogy between sexual subordination and slavery.138 In their view, “woman’s peculiar efforts and powers . . . are
looked upon as an additional badge of inferiority and disgrace.”139
Similarly, in his well-known nineteenth century feminist essay
The Subjection of Women, John Stuart Mill points to the social benefits to be gained “by ceasing to make sex . . . a badge of subjection.”140 In a letter to the abolitionist Gerrit Smith, Elizabeth Cady
Stanton claims that nineteenth-century women’s dress, which was
both visually distinctive and physically confining, was a sort of

133. MATTHEW WARD, THE LIVERY COLLAR IN LATE MEDIEVAL ENGLAND AND WALES:
POLITICS, IDENTITY AND AFFINITY 20 (2016).
134. 47 Cong. Rec. 795 (1883).
135. 2 FRANCIS J. GRUND, THE AMERICANS IN THEIR MORAL, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL
RELATIONS 66 (London, Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown, Green & Longman 1837).
136. 109 U.S. 3, 21 (1883).
137. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION SOURCEBOOK 113 (John Hardman ed., 1999).
138. WILLIAM THOMPSON, APPEAL OF ONE HALF THE HUMAN RACE, WOMEN, AGAINST
THE PRETENSIONS OF THE OTHER HALF, MEN, TO RETAIN THEM IN POLITICAL, AND THENCE
IN CIVIL AND DOMESTIC SLAVERY (Richard Pankhurst ed., Virago Press 1983) (1825).
139. Id. at 206.
140. JOHN STUART MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN (1869), reprinted in 21 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL—ESSAYS ON EQUALITY, LAW, AND EDUCATION,
259, 336 (John M. Robson ed. 1984).

2022]

REDEFINING THE BADGES OF SLAVERY

1315

badge, for it signified that one was a member of a low status group:
“why proclaim our sex on the house-tops” asks Stanton, “seeing
that it is a badge of degradation, and deprives us of so many rights
and privileges wherever we go?”141 African American women held
in bondage were doubly disadvantaged in this respect, in that slave
clothing signified both subordinate gender status and subordinate
racial status. For example, Harriet Ann Jacobs, in her memoir, Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl, describes the cheap linsey-woolsey dress given to her by her master’s wife as “one of the badges of
slavery.”142
Pointing to similarities between the plight of disenfranchised
women and that of disenfranchised African Americans, the suffragist activist Virginia Minor observed of nineteenth-century women
that “[h]er disfranchised condition is a badge of servitude.”143 Stanton used the badges metaphor to compare abolitionism and the
burgeoning women’s rights movement, arguing that “[t]he badge of
degradation is the skin and sex.”144 Similarly, in a letter decrying
the denial of women’s voting rights, the abolitionist William Lloyd
Garrison writes of his “hope . . . to see the day when neither complexion nor sex shall be made a badge of degradation.”145 The suffragist activist Angelina Grimke, protesting the segregation of
Quaker meeting houses by seating herself in an area reserved for
Black people, explained that “[w]hile you put this badge of degradation on our sisters, we feel that it is our duty to share it with
them.”146
Others saw in the American system of slavery a more general
denigration of labor itself. An 1864 editorial in the New York Times
notes one welcome effect of emancipation, namely, that “labor, losing its badge of degradation should become honorable.”147 William
Jay, drafter of the constitution of the American Anti-Slavery
141. 1 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 885 (Elizabeth Cady Stanton et al. eds., New York,
Fowler & Wells 1881).
142. HARRIET ANN JACOBS, INCIDENTS IN THE LIFE OF A SLAVE GIRL: WRITTEN BY
HERSELF 12 (L. Maria Child ed., 2009).
143. See HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note 141, at 730; Plaintiff’s Brief and
Argument, Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1875).
144. Address by Elizabeth Cady Stanton to the American Anti-Slavery Society (May 8,
1860), in 1 THE SELECTED PAPERS OF ELIZABETH CADY STANTON AND SUSAN B. ANTHONY:
IN THE SCHOOL OF ANTI-SLAVERY, 1840 TO 1866 409, 414 (Ann D. Gordon ed., 1997).
145. 3 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 885 (Elizabeth Cady Stanton et al. eds. New York,
Charles Mann Printing Co. 1886).
146. 1 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 394 (Elizabeth Cady Stanton et al. eds., New York,
Fowler & Wells 1881).
147. The Freedmen in South Carolina, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1864, at 2.
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Society, argued that, for the emancipated slave, “labor is no longer
the badge of his servitude.”148 Though such texts specifically discuss the connotation of labor in the midst of chattel slavery, there
was a more general worry that labor itself stigmatized the laborer,
regardless of complexion. For example, Booker T. Washington argues in Up from Slavery that “[t]he whole machinery of slavery was
so constructed as to cause labour, as a rule, to be looked upon as a
badge of degradation, of inferiority.”149 Massachusetts Senator and
abolitionist Henry Wilson invoked this worry as a reason for passing the Thirteenth Amendment, which would, he claimed, uplift
“the poor white man . . . impoverished, debased, dishonored by the
system that makes toil a badge of disgrace.”150 The British pamphleteer and parliamentarian William Cobbet similarly railed
against working-class poverty, which, he claimed was “the great
badge, the never-failing badge of slavery.”151
This broad range of meaning is evident even in the statements
of anti-slavery Congressmen during debates over how to best assist
free African Americans. For example, though the political origins
of the badges metaphor are commonly traced to Congressional debates over the Civil Rights Act of 1866, this is not the first appearance of the phrase in the Congressional record.152 During 1864 Senate debates over the repeal of the Fugitive Slave Acts and the first
Freedmen’s Bureau Act, Massachusetts Senator and Chair of the
Senate’s Select Committee on Slavery and Freedom Charles
Sumner repeatedly invoked the metaphor to condemn racial segregation in public facilities as well as the pernicious political influence of the slave-holding states more generally. “The Fugitive
Slave Bill,” Sumner declared, was “imposed upon the North as a
badge of subjugation.”153 In a later speech, defending a provision of
the Freedmen’s Bureau Act that guaranteed court access to newly
freed African Americans, Sumner argued that unequal access to

148. WILLIAM JAY, AN INQUIRY INTO THE CHARACTER AND TENDENCY OF THE AMERICAN
COLONIZATION, AND AMERICAN ANTI-SLAVERY SOCIETIES 198 (2d ed. New York, Leavitt,
Lord & Co. 1835); see also HENRY WARD BEECHER, NORWOOD: OR, VILLAGE LIFE IN NEW
ENGLAND 286 (New York, Charles Scribner & Co. 1868) (discussing the social stigmatization
of “[w]orking people, in a community where work is the badge of servitude”).
149. BOOKER T. WASHINGTON, UP FROM SLAVERY: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 17 (1901).
150. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1324 (1864).
151. 4 WM. COBBETT, Letter IV to the Working Classes of Preston, in THE POOR MAN’S
FRIEND; OR ESSAYS ON THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE POOR (London, W. Cobbett 1829).
152. See, e.g., McAward, supra note 2 at 578; Rutherglen, supra note 2 at 168.
153. 11 CHARLES SUMNER, CHARLES SUMNER: HIS COMPLETE WORKS 210 (2015).
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civil and military tribunals constituted a “disability [and] exclusion” that imposed “the badge of [S]lavery.”154
According to the restrictive interpretation, during the antebellum period the badges metaphor primarily referred to the legal incidents of chattel slavery or to the status connotations of Black
skin.155 However, as we have seen, historically the metaphor has
possessed a broad range of meanings. During the antebellum period the metaphor was invoked in condemnation not just of racial
injustice but also of unjust economic and political relations, including those based on gender and class.156 Moreover, as Sumner’s usage indicates, a badge of slavery could be imposed even upon free
African Americans who faced unequal access to public facilities.
The first premise of the restrictive interpretation, that in American
political discourse the metaphor referred only to African American
skin color and to the incidents of chattel slavery, is belied by the
historical examples presented above.
Even for American critics of chattel slavery the metaphor was
not limited to the legal incidents of racialized chattel slavery or to
the status connotations of Black skin; rather, the metaphor could
refer to a variety of signifiers associated with racial hierarchy, such
as segregated seating and racially exclusionary access to public institutions. References to skin color, gendered dress, uniforms,
manual labor, and physical segregation imply that badges of slavery were visible signifiers of subordinate social status.157 But the
badges metaphor denoted other forms of subordination as well.
Taxation, tything, tributary payments, the imposition of curfews,
and Fugitive Slave Acts were also condemned as badges of slavery,
indicating that the badges metaphor was not strictly limited to visible signifiers.158 In fact, as I discuss below, in one of the badges’
metaphors earliest appearances in American constitutional law,

154. CHARLES SUMNER, A BRIDGE FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: SPEECH OF HON.
CHARLES SUMNER, ON THE BILL TO ESTABLISH A BUREAU OF FREEDMEN, IN THE SENATE OF
THE UNITED STATES, JUNE 13TH AND 15TH, 1864 13 (Washington, D.C., H. Polkinhorn & Son
1864).
155. See supra Part I.
156. To be fair, Rutherglen and McAward both acknowledge that the badges metaphor
is found outside of American discourse regarding chattel slavery; yet they do not take into
account the extensive linguistic and conceptual history of the metaphor, nor do they attempt
to incorporate this history into their analyses of Section 2.
157. Cf. Rutherglen, supra note 2, at 166 (noting that the badges metaphor referred to
“certain external features [from which] an individual’s social position could be inferred”).
158. See supra notes 122–26 and accompanying text; see also supra note 151 and accompanying text.
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the metaphor refers not to visible signifiers but to stigmatizing
laws and social customs.159
The badges metaphor, then, was not strictly limited to visual
signifiers but included other indicators of subordinate status.
What unifies the various invocations of the badges metaphor, then,
is not any particular type of signifier. Rather, it is a concern for
social signifiers, of whatever sort, that stigmatize and degrade
members of a discrete social group who are deprived of important
rights or liberties. A rough definition of a badge of slavery thus
runs as follows: a badge of slavery is a public indicator of subordinate political or social status. This reading of the badges metaphor
makes the best sense of the historical usages I surveyed above.
Moreover, it has the virtue of drawing a close connection between
the equal protection principle underlying both the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments.160
B. The Badges of Republican Slavery
This rough definition of the badges metaphor is a useful starting
point; however, it is incomplete. To see this, we must move beyond
particular examples to examine the conceptual framework underlying the badges metaphor’s many uses. In short, the badges metaphor must be understood in light of the republican conceptual
framework that structured much eighteenth and nineteenth American political discourse regarding slavery and subordination.
Eighteenth and nineteenth-century American political discourse
drew deeply from two fonts of republican thought.161 The first was
159. See infra section II.C.
160. See tenBroek, supra note 52, at 200 (demonstrating that “[a]t the very foundation
of the system constructed out of the Thirteenth Amendment and the Freedmen’s Bureau
and Civil Rights Bills is an idea of ‘equal protection’”); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE
SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 48 (1986) (noting
that “Republicans believed that the Thirteenth Amendment effectively overruled Dred Scott
so that Blacks were entitled to all rights of citizens”); Akhil Reed Amar, The Case of the
Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 HARV. L. REV. 124, 157 & n.180 (1992)
(discussing the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and arguing that “[n]either
Amendment ‘trumps’ the other; rather they must be synthesized into a coherent doctrinal
whole”). As I have argued elsewhere, equal protection, in the Fourteenth Amendment context, is best conceived of as providing legal protections against discrimination on the basis
of low-status social signifiers. See Nicholas Serafin, In Defense of Immutability, 2020 BYU
L. REV. 275, 278–79 (2020).
161. There is a vast literature on the development and spread of republican ideas. There
is a similarly expansive literature on the relevance of republican ideas to the contemporary
American legal system. See, e.g., J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT:
FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (2016);
QUENTIN SKINNER, LIBERTY BEFORE LIBERALISM (1998); CAROLINE ROBBINS, THE
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that of republican Rome. For Roman historians such as Tacitus,
Livy, Cicero, Sallust, and Gaius, liberty is understood in terms of
the basic distinction between citizen and slave.162 As Gaius writes
in his Institutes, in legal terms a citizen was sui juris, or under his
own authority, whereas a slave was potestate domini, that is, subject to the jurisdiction of their masters.163 As such, slaves were
“perpetually subject or liable to harm or punishment,” or to other
arbitrary interference, from their masters.164 But slavery was not
thought of as a strictly legal condition. Roman moralists and historians believed that anyone who was subject to the will of another,
whether as a matter of public authority or private power, lived in
a state of servitude.165 Not just individuals but entire political communities could be considered slaves in this sense.166
The distinction between the citizen, who is in some significant
respect independent, and the slave, whose choices can be arbitrarily interfered with, is not only central to republican thought;167 it
is also central to eighteenth and nineteenth-century American political discourse concerning slavery. In political pamphlets and
other public writings, educated eighteenth-century Americans,
well-versed in the works of Tacitus and the other major Roman
historians, self-consciously drew upon the republican conception of
slavery.168 In John Adams’ work, for example, the badges metaphor
appears amidst a number of references to Tacitus’ view of slavery;
Tacitus, as I noted above, provides one of the earliest examples of
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY COMMONWEALTHMAN: STUDIES IN THE TRANSMISSION,
DEVELOPMENT, AND CIRCUMSTANCE OF ENGLISH LIBERAL THOUGHT FROM THE RESTORATION
OF CHARLES II UNTIL THE WAR WITH THE THIRTEEN COLONIES 4–5, 20 (1968); BERNARD
BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 22–27 (1967); GORDON
S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787 (1998); M.N.S. SELLERS,
AMERICAN REPUBLICANISM: ROMAN IDEOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 5–6
(1994); Daniel T. Rodgers, Republicanism: The Career of a Concept, 79 J. AM. HIST. 11, 13–
14 (1992); Robert E. Shalhope, Republicanism And Early American Historiography, 39 WM.
& MARY Q. 334, 334–35 (1982). For an overview of republican concepts within modern legal
theory, see generally Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539,
1539 (1987).
162. PETER GARNSEY, IDEAS OF SLAVERY FROM ARISTOTLE TO AUGUSTINE 26 (1996).
163. FRANCIS DE ZULUETA, THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS: PART I TEXT WITH CRITICAL NOTES
AND TRANSLATIONS 17 (1946).
164. SKINNER, supra note 161, at 40–43.
165. Id. at 42.
166. Id. at 45–46.
167. PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 31
(1997) (noting that “in the republican tradition . . . liberty is always cast in terms of the
opposition between liber and servus, citizen and slave”).
168. See SELLERS, supra note 161, at 23 (noting that a “[f]amiliarity with Livy, Sallust,
Cicero and others provided colonists with a well-developed and well-admired alternative to
monarchy, and a republican ideology”).
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the badges metaphor.169 Educated nineteenth-century Americans
also would have been familiar with classical views of slavery, and
references to antiquity similarly colored nineteenth-century political discourse.170
To fully appreciate how deeply the Roman republican vocabulary
influenced American discourse on slavery, it is necessary to consider a second source of republican rhetoric, namely, the writings
of seventeenth-century English Commonwealthmen such as Henry
Neville, James Harrington, and Algernon Sidney.171 These writers
exhibited a similar indebtedness to the Roman republican conception of slavery. According to Sidney, for example, “he is a slave who
serves the best and gentlest man in the world, as well as he who
serves the worst; and he does serve him if he must obey his commands, and depends upon his will.”172 For the Commonwealthmen,
slavery was very often described as subjection to arbitrary, which
is to say unchecked, power. Similarly, Sidney held that “[l]aws are
not made by [k]ings . . . because [n]ations will be governed by
[r]ule, and not [a]rbitrarily.”173 For Sidney, “the multitude [who
live] under the yoke” of an arbitrary ruler bear “a badge of slavery.”174
Eighteenth-century American writers widely adopted the concepts and vocabulary of Sidney and other Commonwealthmen. In
eighteenth-century political texts, for example, ‘arbitrary,’ becomes a watchword denoting tyrannical power, especially that
wielded by the British monarchy over the colonies. According to
one author, the British government possessed “a settled, fixed plan
for enslaving the colonies, or bringing them under arbitrary

169. See 4 CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, THE SECOND
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 561 (Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown 1851)
(citing Tacitus’s view of slavery in support of the claim that ancient monarchies subjected
citizens to slavery).
170. MARGARET MALAMUD, ANCIENT ROME AND MODERN AMERICA 41 (2009) (observing
that “[l]ate eighteenth-century and early nineteenth-century readers used in schools
contained a number of passages on the topic of slavery and liberty including several
passages taken from Roman historians” such as Tacitus).
171. See BAILYN, supra note 161, at 45.
172. ALGERNON SIDNEY, DISCOURSES CONCERNING GOVERNMENT 441 (Thomas G. West
ed., 1990) (1698).
173. Id. at 392; see JAMES HARRINGTON, THE POLITICAL WORKS OF JAMES HARRINGTON
170–71 (J. G. A. Pocock ed., 1977) (asserting that to be free under government is “not to be
controlled but by the law; and that framed by every private man unto no other end . . . than
to protect the liberty of every private man, which by that means comes to be the liberty of
the commonwealth”).
174. See SIDNEY, supra note 172, at 314.
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government.”175 For many eighteenth-century Americans, a despot
was a ruler “bound by no law or limitation but his own will,” and
the exercise of arbitrary power characterized despotic regimes.176
Nineteenth-century labor republicans and abolitionists were
also wont to rely, implicitly or explicitly, on this rhetoric. Labor
republican Seth Luther, for instance, decried the “tyrannical government of the mills,” which, he claimed, was defined by “one sided
and arbitrary rule” over wage laborers.177 Angelina Grimke, whose
invocation of the badges metaphor I noted above, wrote of the “arbitrary power” that slave owners wielded over slaves.178 In a letter
from William Lloyd Garrison to the editor of the Boston Courier,
Garrison quotes extensively from Sidney’s Discourses on Government “in order to show, beyond all contradiction, that ALGERNON
SIDNEY was an Abolitionist of the modern school, as ‘fanatical,’ ‘incendiary,’ ‘denunciatory,’ and ‘blood-thirsty,’ as even [British abolitionist] George Thompson himself.”179 Garrison then proceeds to
quote Sidney’s definition of slavery, according to which a slave is
“a man who can neither dispose of his person or goods, but enjoys
all at the will of his master.”180
As the historian Eric Foner observes, in eighteenth-century
American political discourse “slavery was primarily a political category, shorthand for the denial of one’s personal and political
rights by arbitrary government.”181 This usage continued into the
nineteenth-century, influencing not just the abolitionist movement
but the early feminist and workers’ movements as well. To be sure,
from the fact that many eighteenth and nineteenth-century Americans used classically republican vocabulary to condemn slavery
one cannot conclude that they understood slavery in precisely the
same manner.182 Even among abolitionists there were deep

175. See BAILYN, supra note 161, at 119.
176. See ADAMS, supra note 169, at 107.
177. ALEX GOUREVITCH, FROM SLAVERY TO THE COOPERATIVE COMMONWEALTH: LABOR
AND REPUBLICAN LIBERTY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 77 (2015).
178. NANCY WOLOCH, EARLY AMERICAN WOMEN: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, 1600–1900
234 (1997).
179. Letter from William Lloyd Garrison to the Editor of the Boston Courier (Mar. 4,
1837), in 2 WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON, THE LETTERS OF WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON: A HOUSE
DIVIDING AGAINST ITSELF 1836–1840 217, 219 (Louis Ruchames ed., 1971).
180. Id.
181. ERIC FONER, THE STORY OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 29 (1998).
182. See Don Herzog, Some Questions for Republicans, 14 POL. THEORY 473, 481 (1986)
(observing that a shared republican vocabulary is consistent with profound conceptual
differences).
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disagreements over what were the core components of slavery.183
Likely the same point can be made with regard to the badges metaphor: given the evident disagreement over what constituted slavery there surely also would have been disagreement over how to
identify its badges. It would thus be too quick to conclude from the
evidence presented above that from usage of the badges metaphor
one can infer a commitment to philosophical republicanism.
At the same time, however, the badges metaphor cannot be fully
understood shorn of the broader republican conceptual framework
that structured eighteenth and nineteenth-century American political discourse. The restrictive interpretation requires that we ignore this framework, narrowing our understanding of the badges
metaphor to those instances in which the metaphor referred to African American skin color or to the incidents of racialized chattel
slavery. But this is an arbitrary restriction, for there is no evidence
that Republicans and abolitionists limited their usage of the metaphor in this way, let alone other eighteenth and nineteenth-century American political actors. Indeed, as I have shown above,
there is a good deal of evidence demonstrating just the opposite.
The restrictive interpretation fails to account for this evidence
and thus is unable to explain why the badges metaphor was so often invoked in condemnation of gender and class subordination,
not to mention other perceived injustices that bore little resemblance to racialized chattel slavery and its aftermath. Taking into
account the republican background to the badges metaphor, by
contrast, provides a plausible explanation of the metaphor’s many
appearances in European and American political discourse. Republicanism provided for European and American reformers a conceptual vocabulary useful for identifying and denouncing certain
group-based deprivations of important rights and liberties. On the
republican view, groups deprived of important rights and liberties
possessed a separate, and unequal, status. While chattel slavery
constituted the extreme end of status inequality, the badges metaphor was very often applied to inequalities that fell far short of
racialized, chattel slavery.

183. According to William Lloyd Garrison, for example, even under a broader, republican
understanding of slavery “[i]t seems to us an abuse of language to talk of the ‘slavery of
wages.’” Free and Slave Labor, THE LIBERATOR, Mar. 26, 1847, at 50.
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C. The Badges of Slavery from Dred Scott to the Civil Rights
Cases
Proponents of the restrictive interpretation maintain that, in
American political discourse, the badges metaphor referred narrowly “to the color of an African American’s skin or other indications of legal and social inferiority connected with slavery.”184 As I
demonstrated above, however, the badges metaphor was a widely
circulated political trope, or cluster of tropes, commonly used to
condemn subjection to arbitrary exercises of authority. The metaphor was never restricted only to the law of slavery but included
discriminatory practices targeting free African Americans. The
metaphor also ranged beyond race to include class and gender.
The second objection to the restrictive interpretation concerns
the origin and meaning of the metaphor within American jurisprudence. The badges metaphor does not first appear, as proponents
of the restrictive interpretation assert, in Blyew, Rhodes, or the
Civil Rights Cases. Rather, the badges metaphor appears earlier,
in Dred Scott v. Sanford.185 Moreover, in Dred Scott Chief Justice
Taney does not use the metaphor to refer only to the incidents of
chattel slavery.186 As I shall demonstrate here, Taney uses the
badges metaphor to refer to state actions or social customs that
stigmatized African Americans, whether free or enslaved. That a
badge of slavery could be imposed upon free African Americans,
living in states that had permanently abolished slavery, is further
evidence against the restrictive interpretation.
The facts, holding, and aftermath of Dred Scott are, of course,
well known: Scott, an enslaved African American, brought suit in
state and then federal court, arguing that upon establishing residence in a free state and in federal territory he and his family had
become American citizens.187 Recall that Taney’s majority opinion

184. See McAward, supra note 2, at 581.
185. The badges metaphor appears in both Chief Justice Taney’s majority opinion and
in Justice Peter Daniel’s concurrence. In his concurring opinion, Justice Daniel, comparing
American slavery to slavery in ancient Rome, notes that Roman slaves bore a “badge of
disgrace.” Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 479 (1857) (Daniel, J., concurring)
(enslaved party) superseeded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend XIV. I focus
primarily on Taney’s opinion, as his usage is most clearly at odds with the restrictive interpretation.
186. Id. at 416–17 (majority opinion).
187. See id. at 400. For a comprehensive overview of the issues involved in the Dred Scott
decision, see generally DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN
AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS (1978).
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is not simply intended to rebut the claim that Scott and his family
were citizens. Taney endeavors to show more generally that African Americans always were and always would be excluded from
the “new political family, which the Constitution brought into existence.”188
Taney’s argument revolves around proving that African Americans had always been treated as an outcast group, and he repeatedly uses the badges metaphor to describe the stigmatizing effect
of laws that maintained racial hierarchy. Racially discriminatory
laws, according to Taney, “stigmatized” and “impressed . . . deep
and enduring marks of inferiority and degradation” upon African
Americans as a group.189 As Taney recognized, however, in some
states, free African Americans could become citizens and vote, suggesting that, even if not granted the full rights of citizenship, free
African Americans possessed some standing within their political
communities.190 Yet, Taney maintains that the existence of free African Americans does not refute his argument, for free African
Americans “were identified in the public mind with the race to
which they belonged, and regarded as a part of the slave population
rather than the free.”191
Taney’s point is that even those African Americans free from the
legal incidents of slavery nevertheless bore its badges. To support
this claim, Taney cites several laws in free states that denied important rights and privileges to African Americans.192 It is worth
paying particular attention to Taney’s discussion of anti-miscegenation statutes, for Taney focuses less on the penal function of
these laws and more on the fact that such laws served to express
the White majority’s view that free African Americans were less
than full citizens. For example, Taney cites one anti-miscegenation
law forbidding
the marriage of any white person with any negro, Indian, or mulatto,
and inflicts a penalty of fifty pounds upon anyone who shall join them
in marriage; and declares all such marriage absolutely null and void,

188. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 406.
189. Id. at 416.
190. Id. at 572–74; FEHRENBACHER, supra note 187, at 66 (observing that “the evidence
is that by implication, sufferance, and inadvertence they often classified [free African
Americans] as [citizens]”).
191. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 411 (emphasis added).
192. See id. at 415–16.
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and degrades thus the unhappy issue of the marriage by fixing upon
it the stain of bastardy.193

This law, Taney asserts, imposed a “mark of degradation” upon
African Americans.194 But note that Taney is not referring solely to
the legal restrictions on interracial marriage; rather, he is referring to the expressive effect of such laws.195 Anti-miscegenation
laws, as Taney is keen to point out, placed a stain—that is, a social
stigma—upon those who would enter into such marriages and
upon the children of any such marriages.196
The Dred Scott opinion is not the only text in which Taney makes
this argument. In his 1858 “Supplement to the Dred Scott Opinion,” published in response to the “various comments and reviews
of the opinion . . . adverse to the decision of the Court,”197 Taney
explicitly argues that the badges metaphor did not refer to the incidents of slavery. According to Taney, “The Supreme Court did not
decide the case upon the ground that the slavery of the ancestor
affixed a mark of inferiority upon the issue which degraded them
below the rank of citizens.”198 Rather, Taney notes,
The argument in the opinion rests, not upon the actual condition of
the ancestors of the plaintiff as to freedom or slavery, but is placed
altogether upon the condition of the race to which he belonged, and
upon the opinions then entertained by the white race universally, in
the civilized portions of Europe and in this country, in relation to the
powers and rights which they might justly and morally exercise over
[African Americans].199

In other words, for Taney, slavery did not impose a badge upon
Africans and African Americans. Just the opposite: it was the attitudes, beliefs, and social customs reinforcing Black subordination
that imposed the badge. Black subordination “was not merely an
admitted axiom upon which it was morally lawful to act . . . but it
was habitually and daily acted upon by themselves in their

193. Id. at 413 (citation omitted).
194. Id.
195. Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1525 (2000) (asserting that in addition to their regulative functions, laws also may contain expressive content that can be ascertained only “in
light of the community’s other practices, its history, and shared meanings”).
196. On the connection between stain and stigma, see Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and
Amendment 2: Romer’s Rightness, MICH. L. REV. 203, 208–09 (1996).
197. SAMUEL TYLER, MEMOIR OF ROGER BROOKE TANEY, LL.D., CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 607 (Baltimore, J. Murphy & Co. 1872).
198. Id. at 578 (emphasis added).
199. Id. at 578–79.
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domestic and social relations or under their own eyes.”200 And, just
as he had done in the official Dred Scott opinion, Taney invokes the
social consequences of interracial marriage to confirm the point. In
every state in the Union, Taney claimed, an interracial union was
“deemed unnatural” and “exclude[d] [White men and women] from
the social positions to which they were before entitled.”201
Taney’s usage of the badges metaphor in Dred Scott and in the
Supplement is deeply revealing, and it cuts against the restrictive
interpretation. First, Taney’s usage of the metaphor demonstrates
that the purported distinction between the metaphor in political
discourse and the metaphor as a legal term of art is illusory. Consider, for example, that Taney’s usage of the metaphor is echoed,
to opposite effect, by the abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison. For
Garrison, too, prohibitions against interracial marriage constituted “disgraceful badge[s] of servitude.”202 But note that Rutherglen characterizes Garrison’s usage as political, not legal. That is,
in Rutherglen’s view, Garrison is pointing out that “[l]aws against
miscegenation . . . did not draw out a consequence of actual slavery
but were an indication of symbolic slavery.”203 While Rutherglen
argues that “[t]his sense of ‘badge’ rarely appeared in the law of
slavery,” one would be hard pressed to find a more canonical example of nineteenth-century legal views of slavery than those expressed in Dred Scott.204
Taney’s focus on anti-miscegenation laws reveals yet another
weakness of the restrictive interpretation. According to the restrictive interpretation, a badge of slavery, as a legal term of art, referred only to laws restricting the rights of African Americans.205
However, the antimiscegenation laws that Taney cites threatened
punishment for White people, albeit to a lesser extent than Black
people. White people who attempted to intermarry would be temporarily made servants, a degraded status for a White citizen

200. Id. at 599.
201. Id. at 601.
202. See Rutherglen, supra note 2, at 165.
203. Id. at 166.
204. Id. To be sure, Taney’s opinion has been widely “condemned as a striking example
of poor scholarship and weak legal reasoning.” Paul Finkelman, Was Dred Scott Correctly
Decided? An “Expert Report” for the Defendant, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1219, 1223 (2008).
At the same time, “the Taney opinion is, for all practical purposes, the Dred Scott decision
and therefore a historical document of prime importance.” FEHRENBACHER, supra note 187,
at 337.
205. See supra notes 46–48 and accompanying text.
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though one still superior to that of a chattel slave.206 In Taney’s
view, the point of such laws was to maintain an “impassable barrier” between racial groups, thereby reinforcing the stigmatized
status of African Americans as a group.207 While a law restricting
the rights of African Americans was the most direct route to this
outcome, the racial boundary Taney sought to defend could be reinforced by punishing White people as well. Only a stigma-based
interpretation is able to explain how, in states that had permanently abolished slavery, a law restricting the rights of free African
Americans and Whites imposed a badge of slavery.
Finally, it is important to note that Taney’s reasoning draws a
clear connection between the badges metaphor and another concept central to understanding the Thirteenth Amendment, namely,
custom. The Thirteenth Amendment directly regulates private
conduct, for, as the framers of the amendment were aware, social
customs were essential to the legitimation and maintenance of the
slave system as a whole and to the law of slavery in particular.208
Courts relied on local customs “to fill gaps or resolve ambiguities”
in the law of slavery as well as to “to generate the legal, social, and
civil disabilities of the enslaved.”209 Courts cited local customs, for
example, as justification for imposing heightened punishments for
enslaved individuals who assaulted Whites but lesser punishments for Whites who assaulted enslaved African Americans.210 By
legally sanctioning these violent customs, courts both ratified and

206. For example, Taney quotes a 1717 Maryland law stating that “any white man or
white woman who shall intermarry . . . with any negro or mulatto . . . shall become servants
during the term of seven years . . . .” Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 408, 413
(1857) (citations omitted) (enslaved party) superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV. Taney quotes a similar Massachusetts law, which threatened
punishment for the individual, irrespective of their race, who officiated at interracial unions.
Id. at 413 (citations omitted).
207. Id. at 409.
208. Darrell A.H. Miller, White Cartels, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and the History of
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 999, 1032 (2008) (noting that “Congress
received ample evidence of discrimination by collectives of Southerners acting as
legislatures, but it also heard evidence of discrimination perpetrated by collectives of
Southerners acting in their private capacity”).
209. Darrell A.H. Miller, The Thirteenth Amendment and the Regulation of Custom, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 1811, 1815, 1825 (2012).
210. Id. at 1825; see also Mark Tushnet, The American Law of Slavery, 1810–1860: A
Study in the Persistence of Legal Autonomy, 10 L. & SOC’Y REV. 119, 143 (1975) (noting that
in one North Carolina case, the court concluded that “the habits of humility and obedience
which belong to the condition of the slave . . . required by the inveterate usages of our people
. . . clearly forbid that an ordinary assault or battery should be deemed, as it is between
white men, a legal provocation”).
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reinforced their stigmatizing effect, a point to which I shall return
in Part III.
Taney’s usage of the badges metaphor similarly links racially
discriminatory custom with laws maintaining African American
subordination. As Chief Justice Taney surely must have known, a
law annulling interracial marriages could stigmatize its targets
only in virtue of the fact that interracial couples faced severe social
sanction from Whites committed to maintaining racial hierarchy.211 Similarly, a law which fixed upon an interracial marriage
the “stain of bastardy” also drew upon private custom, as the degraded status of a bastard was as much a social as a legal condition.212 The broader point is that, as Taney’s analysis indicates, a
badge of slavery was not simply equivalent to a legal incident of
slavery, nor was it solely a reference to skin color. Rather, a badge
of slavery was imposed by state actions or social customs that stigmatized subordinate groups.
It is instructive to compare Taney’s usage of the badges metaphor with how the metaphor was used several decades later in the
Civil Rights Cases. In the Civil Rights Cases, there is a telling divergence between the majority and dissent regarding the meaning
of the metaphor. Justice Bradley, writing for the majority, claims
that prior to the abolition of slavery “[m]ere discriminations on account of race or color were not regarded as badges of slavery.”213
“There were thousands of free colored people in this country before
the abolition of slavery,” Bradley asserts, “yet no one, at that time,
thought that it was any invasion of his personal status as a freeman because he was not admitted to all the privileges enjoyed by
white citizens, or because he was subjected to discriminations” in
211. For example, an 1871 report from the Richmond Daily Dispatch notes that a white
woman discovered living with an African American man was “‘tarred and feathered and
exiled from the county.’” DeNeen L. Brown, Before Loving v. Virginia, Another Interracial
Couple Fought in Court for their Marriage, WASH. POST (June 12, 2017), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/news/retropolis/wp/2017/06/11/before-loving-v-virginia-another-interracialcouple-fought-in-court-for-their-marriage [https://perma.cc/L5NG-ZXP7].
212. A 1939 Article on the sociology of illegitimacy opens with the following observation:
“The bastard, like the prostitute, thief, and beggar, belongs to that motley crowd of disreputable social types which society has generally resented, always endured. He is a living
symbol of social irregularity, an undeniable evidence of contramoral forces; in short, a problem—a problem as old and unsolved as human existence itself.” Kingsley Davis, Illegitimacy
and the Social Structure, 45 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 215, 215 (1939); see also John Witte, Jr.,
Ishmael’s Bane: The Sin and Crime of Illegitimacy Reconsidered, 5 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y
327, 328, 335 (2003) (arguing that illegitimate children “bore the permanent stigma of their
sinful and criminal conception,” which precluded them from “positions of social visibility
and responsibility”).
213. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883).
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access to public facilities.214 Thus, he argues, Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment cannot sustain the provisions of the Civil
Rights Act of 1876 banning discrimination in public accommodations.215
For proponents of the restrictive interpretation “it is not immediately clear that the majority was wrong to limit the coverage of
the Section 2 power to public actors,” because “the term ‘badge’ of
slavery was regarded in judicial circles as a post-emancipation synonym” for the incidents of slavery.216 Yet, as we have seen in Dred
Scott, Taney, following the common meaning of the metaphor, uses
the badges metaphor to refer to racially discriminatory laws in
states that had abolished slavery.217 Such laws imposed badges of
slavery not because they maintained or attempted to reimpose the
slave system; they imposed badges of slavery because, in conjunction with the White community’s social customs, they imposed a
stigma upon African Americans as a group.
A more historically grounded understanding of the badges metaphor is to be found in Justice Marshall Harlan’s dissent. According to Justice Harlan, “discrimination practised [sic] by corporations and individuals in the exercise of their public or quasi-public
functions is a badge of servitude,” and, as such, is a proper target
of Thirteenth Amendment regulation.218 Though employing the
metaphor to opposite ends, Harlan’s usage of the metaphor follows
Taney’s in that it supposes that public discrimination reinforced by
private custom may impose a badge of slavery.219 In fact, in his
opinion Harlan invokes Dred Scott to castigate the majority’s
cramped construal of the Reconstruction Amendments. This is a
refrain Harlan would sound again in Plessy v. Ferguson, where
Harlan reiterates his view that the “arbitrary separation of citizens
on the basis of race while they are on a public highway is a badge
of servitude.”220 Of course, the Plessy majority infamously denies
that segregation marks African Americans with “a badge of inferiority.”221 That the restrictive interpretation aligns more closely

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Id.
Id. at 25–26.
See McAward, supra note 2, at 615.
See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 43 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
See supra notes 201–05 and accompanying text.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 562 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 551 (majority opinion).
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with the Plessy majority opinion than with Harlan’s now-canonical
dissent provides yet another reason to reject the view.222
Ultimately the restrictive interpretation is untenable. The
badges metaphor was by no means unique to American political
discourse, nor did it refer solely to chattel slavery or to the incidents thereof. Long before it entered American political discourse
the badges metaphor referred to a wide variety of formal and informal stigmatizing practices. American political actors who took
up the metaphor followed this broad pattern of usage, such that for
many politically active nineteenth-century Americans stigmatizing practices associated with race, class, and gender imposed
badges of slavery. Moreover, the badges metaphor as a legal term
of art, first appearing in Dred Scott, did not fundamentally deviate
from the metaphor as found in popular or political discourse. In
both cases a badge of slavery referred to state actions or social customs that stigmatized subordinate groups.
III. ERADICATING THE CONTEMPORARY BADGES OF SLAVERY
Section 2 is not limited to preventing the reimposition chattel
slavery or its de facto equivalent. Section 2 grants Congress the
authority to target stigmatizing laws and social customs, for these
practices impose a badge of slavery. I shall now discuss how this
interpretation of Section 2 can be applied in practice. As there are
far too many proposed uses of Section 2 to discuss in this space, the
discussion here is meant to be illustrative. My aim is to provide a
general approach to constructing and assessing Section 2 arguments in light of the expansive interpretation I presented above.
First, consider again the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr.,
Hate Crimes Prevention Act (“HCPA”). The HCPA falls within
Congress’s Section 2 authority, and the expansive interpretation of
the badges metaphor explains why. On the expansive interpretation, to determine whether § 249(a)(1) is a valid exercise of Congress’s Section 2 authority it is necessary to determine whether
bias-motivated violence is a social custom that imposes stigmatic
harm upon a particular group. Though a concern for stigmatic
harm traditionally sounds in equal protection, the doctrine is readily transferrable to the Thirteenth Amendment context. Whether
considered under the Fourteenth or the Thirteenth Amendment,
222. On the canonization of Harlan’s Plessy dissent, see Richard A. Primus, Canon, Anticanon, and Judicial Dissent, 48 DUKE L.J. 243, 256–57, 245–46 & n.14 (1998).
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the determining factor is whether the act in question singles out a
particular group for status-based deprivations of rights, liberties,
or privileges that are generally available to others.223
Bias-motivated racial and ethnic violence imposes stigmatic
harm in this sense. Though bias-motivated violence results in
harm to individual victims, such crimes are symbolic acts that single out particular groups. As hate crime researcher Barbara Perry
observes, bias-motivated violence is “generally directed toward
those whom our society has traditionally stigmatized and marginalized” with the intended aim of reaffirming the “precarious hierarchies” that characterize social and political life.224 Through the
infliction of brutal violence, perpetrators intend “not only to subordinate the victim, but also to subdue his or her community, to intimidate a group of people” defined by a particular trait or perceived difference from the norm.225 This message of intimidation
does not go unheard: as survey evidence reveals, members of a community targeted by bias-motivated violence report fearing, with
good reason, that they are not fully and equally protected by existing law and that this lack of protection leaves members of their
group subject to the violent and arbitrary impulses of malicious
private actors.226
The long history of private violence targeting racial and ethnic
minorities in the United States largely tracks these generalizations. For example, violence directed towards African Americans
in the post-Reconstruction era was not simply an attempt to
reestablish chattel slavery. Rather, as legal historian Ely Aaronson
notes, extralegal violence targeting African Americans, alongside
the state’s unwillingness to seek redress for Black victims, “symbolize[d] and enforce[d] the second-class status of African Americans.”227 Similar points apply to violence directed towards ethnic
minorities. As Perry notes, ethnic violence, for perpetrators, is a
means by which to punish groups who are perceived to have
223. See Amar, supra note 196, at 214 (asserting that a law imposes a stigma when it
“singles out a named [class of] persons” for status-based disadvantage).
224. BARBARA PERRY, IN THE NAME OF HATE: UNDERSTANDING HATE CRIMES 3 (2001).
225. Id. at 10.
226. Barbara Perry, Exploring the Community Impacts of Hate Crime, in THE
ROUTLEDGE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON HATE CRIME 51 (Nathan Hall et al. eds., 2015)
(reviewing evidence demonstrating that members of the victim class who learn of biasmotivated violence “feel themselves to be equally vulnerable to victimization . . . Regardless
of context, there is a constant fear of assault”).
227. ELY AARONSON, FROM SLAVE ABUSE TO HATE CRIME: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF
RACIAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 97 (2014).
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“overstep[ped] their boundaries by assuming they, too, are worthy
of first-class citizenship.”228 Indeed, the recent surge of attacks targeting Asian Americans is but the latest episode in a long history
of violence aimed at subordinating and stigmatizing communities
perceived as foreign.229 Given the stigmatizing intent and effect of
bias-motivated violence, § 249(a)(1) is well-within Congress’s Section 2 authority.
A slightly different analysis is required for § 249(a)(2) of the
HCPA. Section 249(a)(2) establishes criminal penalties for assaults
motivated by the victim’s “gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability.”230 The constitutionality of § 249(a)(2) turns on
whether Congress can use its Section 2 authority to protect nonracial groups. As I demonstrated above, according to historical usage,
women, laborers, and others could bear a badge of slavery.231 There
is thus a prima facie case for including nonracial groups under Section 2.
That being said, it is undeniable that chattel slavery uniquely
targeted African Americans, and given the close association of
chattel slavery with racial subordination, Section 2 proposals that
include nonracial classifications will likely face skepticism from
courts, among other legal actors. Whereas many scholars who have
offered Section 2 proposals seem to assume that Section 2 straightforwardly extends to all groups, I propose a compromise: while it is
within Congress’s authority to extend Section 2 coverage to nonracial groups, when exercising this authority Congress must provide
evidence that the stigmatic harms targeted are fairly closely analogous to stigmatic harms suffered by African Americans. This
higher evidentiary standard would ensure that Section 2 legislation does not drift too far from the one of the core aims of the Thirteenth Amendment, namely, protecting African Americans from
stigmatizing and degrading treatment.
Section 249(a)(2) is a valid use of Congress’s Section 2 authority,
even assuming a heightened evidentiary standard. This is because
violence targeting individuals on the basis of gender, sex, or sexual
orientation is closely analogous to violence targeting racial

228. See Perry, supra note 226, at 61.
229. See id. at 59–65.
230. 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2). For the sake of space my argument focuses on the inclusion
of sexual orientation in the HCPA; separate arguments would need to be made for other
classifications.
231. See supra section I.A.
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minorities. First, as a number of feminist scholars have pointed
out, both forms of bias-motivated violence serve to single out and
stigmatize the victim’s broader social group in order to maintain
group hierarchy.232 Moreover, historically the criminal justice system has similarly failed to protect members of the LGBTQ+ community from violent attack and often failed to prosecute those who
commit such attacks. In fact, in some cases, state agents are among
those perpetrating homophobic violence.233 Violence targeting
LGBTQ+ individuals thus bears important similarities to violence
targeting African Americans.
The case for Section 2 authority is even stronger given the relationship between customary homophobic violence and criminal defense law. Consider that most state courts still permit the so-called
“gay panic” defense in criminal trials.234 The gay panic defense is
an informal defensive strategy that relies “on the notion that a
criminal defendant should be excused or justified if his violent actions were in response to a (homo)sexual advance.”235 In gay panic
cases, masculine social customs regarding the infliction of homophobic violence are used to generate a special set of legal disabilities for LGBTQ individuals.236 The defense also accords a special
set of legal privileges for heterosexual men: according to one analysis, for example, the gay panic defense successfully leads to a reduction of charges in about one-third of all cases in which it is
raised, despite the fact that “the majority of these homicides involve incredible violence.”237 By permitting the gay panic defense,
232. See Perry, supra 221, at 83 (observing that “[j]ust as racially motivated violence
seeks to reestablish ‘proper’ alignment between racial groups, so too is gender-motivated
violence intended to restore men and women to ‘their place’”); see also Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1301 (1991) (noting evidence demonstrating that “[w]omen are sexually assaulted because they are women: not
individually or at random, but on the basis of sex, because of their membership in a group
defined by gender” (citations omitted)).
233. See generally Kirstin S. Dodge, “Bashing Back”: Gay and Lesbian Street Patrols and
the Criminal Justice System, 11 L. & INEQ. 295 (1993).
234. Courts in 39 American States Still Admit the “Gay-Panic” Defence, ECONOMIST
(Nov. 28, 2020), https://www.economist.com/united-states/2020/11/28/courts-in-39-americ
an-states-still-admit-the-gay-panic-defence [https://perma.cc/T6TF-UJNM].
235. Cynthia Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 471, 475 (2008).
236. In a notorious 2015 case, James Miller successfully employed this strategy, receiving a six-month sentence after stabbing to death his neighbor, Daniel Spencer. See Julie
Compton, Alleged ‘Gay Panic Defense’ in Texas Murder Trial Stuns Advocates, NBC NEWS,
https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/alleged-gay-panic-defense-texas-murder-trial-st
uns-advocates-n870571 [https://perma.cc/K32C-ZJGD] (May 2, 2018, 2:12 PM).
237. W. Carsten Andresen, I Track Murder Cases that Use the ‘Gay Panic Defense,’ a
Controversial Practice Banned in 9 States, CONVERSATION (Jan. 29, 2020, 8:21 AM),
https://theconversation.com/i-track-murder-cases-that-use-the-gay-panic-defense-a-controv
ersial-practice-banned-in-9-states-129973 [https://perma.cc/9MPC-RDQL].
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the law incorporates and legitimizes heterosexist social customs,
just as the law of slavery incorporated and legitimized social customs regarding the infliction violence upon the enslaved.238
Analogical arguments can be used to extend Congress’s Section
2 authority to other groups as well. Contemporary legal scholars
have plausibly argued, for example, that private violence targeting
women imposes a badge of slavery. Though none of these scholars
have offered a historical interpretation of the badges metaphor,
these arguments nonetheless persuasively demonstrate that gender-based violence stigmatizes women. First, as I noted in Part II,
nineteenth-century abolitionists and feminists invoked the badges
metaphor to draw attention to commonalities between race and
gender subordination. For nineteenth-century feminists, one crucial commonality was their similar susceptibility to private violence and a lack of legal recourse.239 A convincing argument for
Section 2 legislation including gender classifications would build
on this analogy by noting that, similar to racial and ethnic violence,
contemporary gender-based violence “terrorizes the collective by
victimizing the individual” in order to “establish an ‘appropriate’
hierarchy in which men are dominant, women subordinate.”240
Moreover, the stigmatizing effects of gender-based private violence
endure in part due to the unwillingness of state actors to fully investigate and prosecute such crimes.241 Violent crimes targeting
African American women, in particular, are systematically under
prosecuted.242
Though this is just the outline of an argument for extending Section 2 coverage to women, the similarities to racially bias-motivated racial violence are apparent. Just as with the HCPA, through
a combination of private violence and state neglect women are singled out for a status-based disability. To be sure, expanding Section
2 coverage to new groups via analogical reasoning may seem foreign to Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence. Identifying new
groups that warrant heightened antidiscrimination protection has
become almost exclusively a Fourteenth Amendment issue. Yet it
238. See supra section II.C.
239. Alexander Tsesis, Gender Discrimination and the Thirteenth Amendment, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1661–67 (2012).
240. See PERRY, supra note 224, at 83–84.
241. See, e.g., Andrea Quinlan, Visions of Public Safety, Justice, and Healing: The Making of the Rape Kit Backlog in the United States, 29 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 225, 225–26 (2020)
(discussing the history of the “hundreds of thousands of untested forensic sexual assault
kits sitting in police storage facilities and forensic labs across the United States”).
242. See generally Pokorak, supra note 7.
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is worth revisiting this common assumption about the appropriate
method of interpretation for each Amendment. As the history surveyed in Part II reveals, many groups adopted the badges metaphor precisely because they saw analogies between the stigmatization inherent in chattel slavery and their own subordinate position.
Furthermore, as Alexander Tsesis has argued, expanding the scope
of the Fourteenth Amendment to include new groups goes “well
beyond the text of the Amendment, the intent of its founders, and
the internal coherence of its sections.”243 And yet it is hard to imagine a modern equal protection doctrine that lacks protections for
women, among other groups.244 The historical usage of the badges
metaphor indicates that we should be similarly willing to extend
the scope of Section 2. Regardless of identity, any group that is singled out for status-based deprivations of rights, liberties, or privileges warrants Section 2 protection.
CONCLUSION: SECTION 2 OPTIMISM
A badge of slavery referred to state actions or social customs that
stigmatized subordinate groups. Going forward, Section 2 proposals and arguments should seek to demonstrate that the targeted injustice singles out particular groups for status-based deprivations of rights, liberties, or privileges that are generally
available to others. This framework best accounts for the historical
evidence, and that badges of slavery endure to this day, prompting
a renewed need for Section 2 legislation.
Yet it is also reasonable to wonder whether expansive uses of
Section 2 can find traction outside of the legal academy. The skeptical reactions that greet many badges proposals stem from a paradox inherent in contemporary Thirteenth Amendment scholarship. As Jamal Greene observes, many legal scholars are
Thirteenth Amendment “optimists,” in that they believe that “the
Amendment prohibits in its own terms, or should be read by Congress to prohibit, practices that one opposes but that do not in any
obvious way constitute either chattel slavery or involuntary servitude as those terms are ordinarily understood.”245 Most Thirteenth
Amendment proposals—such as using the Amendment to combat
abortion restrictions and racial profiling—are optimistic in this
243. See Tsesis, supra note 239, at 1681.
244. Id.
245. Jamal Greene, Thirteenth Amendment Optimism, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1733, 1735
(2012).
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sense. But as Greene points out, the suggestion that any of these
injustices “qualif[y] as slavery or may be regulated as such does
not merely feel technically incorrect as a matter of current legal
doctrine; it intuitively seems to misunderstand the English language and the terms of art used within it.”246 That is, no matter
how clever the argument or how compelling the analogy, a good
deal of contemporary Thirteenth Amendment proposals simply do
not survive first contact with the text of the Amendment.
As Greene acknowledges, however, the legal and political import
of Section 2 is far from settled. Indeed, one of the main points of
his Article is to juxtapose “the relative narrowness of Section 1 and
the relative generativity of Section 2.”247 For Greene the generativity of Section 2 will not come from judicial interpretation, which,
he believes, will almost surely disappoint Thirteenth Amendment
optimists. For Greene the generativity of Section 2 must come instead from political mobilization and Congressional legislation. In
his view, Section 2 “burden[s] Congress with a constitutional responsibility to root out pervasive and demeaning inequality and
subjugation even in the absence of local governmental action.”248
Focusing on Section 2, as opposed to Section 1, “may help, in small
ways, to motivate the political process necessary to craft legislation
ultimately grounded in other substantive provisions.”249
I am slightly more optimistic than Greene, in that I do not foreclose the possibility that a future Court could take up the expansive interpretation of the badges metaphor. The expansive interpretation possesses a respectable judicial lineage, running from
Taney’s anti-canonical majority opinion in Dred Scott to Harlan’s
canonical dissent in Plessy, and then on to Jones, upon which a
future Court may rightly wish to build. Nevertheless, Greene’s caution is well-taken, and one underlying aim of this Article has been
to show how Section 2 arguments might contribute to the sort of
political and legislative mobilization that he envisions. Debates
over the badges metaphor are, of course, debates about the ways in
which certain words were used in the past. At the same time they
are, more importantly, debates over how to frame the relationship
between past practices and present conditions. If we conceive of
slavery as a temporally discrete legal regime, and if we understand

246.
247.
248.
249.

Id. at 1736.
Id. at 1766 n.178.
Id. at 1763.
Id. at 1756.
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the badges metaphor as a reference to distinct features of this regime, then the Thirteenth Amendment likely is a dead end for most
contemporary purposes.
As I have argued in this Article, however, the historical evidence
does not compel these interpretative choices. On the contrary,
many who used the badges metaphor sought to eradicate not just
a particular legal regime but also the commitments to group hierarchy, stigma, and subordination that underlay the slave system.
Accordingly, Section 2, and the badges metaphor, call on Congress
and the public to eradicate the lingering traces of group stigma, in
whatever form they are found. To do so requires public discussion
and debate over the extent to which contemporary inequalities follow from, or at least reflect, the unjust hierarchies of the past. This
is a discussion that some vehemently wish to avoid.250 But this resistance is, perhaps, a hopeful indication of the critical potential
that Section 2 retains.

250. See, e.g., Char Adams, Republicans Announce Federal Bills to ‘Restrict the Spread’
of Critical Race Theory, NBC NEWS (May 12, 2021, 4:54 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/
news/nbcblk/republicans-announce-federal-bills-restrict-spread-critical-race-theory-n1267
161 [https://perma.cc/27C5-DLED].

